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USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS

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CONTENTS

MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

Carpathian MD Political Shortcomings Discussed
(KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 27 Sep 86)..... 1

ARMED FORCES

Trainer Remains in Boxes After Two Years
(G. Torzhok; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 21 Aug 86)..... 3

Editorial on Work With Letters
(KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 16 Sep 86)..... 4

Briefs

Obituary: Col Ye. I. Zimin 7
Obituary: Maj Gen V. P. Rogovoy 7

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

Lt Gen Avn Buravkov Writes on Air Fleet Day
(Avn I. Ye. Buravkov; ZARYA VOSTOKA, 17 Aug 86)..... 8

Articles Commemorate Air Fleet Day
(Various sources, various dates)..... 11

Col Gen Batekhin Article 11
Col Gen Dolnikov Article 13
Lt Gen Zhabin Article 15

SPECIAL TROOPS

More on Raising Efficiency of Military Construction
(N. Chekov; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 22 Aug 86)..... 18

MILITARY HISTORY

History of State Defense Committee Detailed
(Petr Studenikin, Ivan Taranenko; PRAVDA, 30 Jun 86)..... 22

FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Views NATO Conventional War Scenarios
(V. Alekseyev; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 3-4 Oct 86)..... 33

IZVESTIYA Comments on NATO Ground, U.S. Naval Exercises
(IZVESTIYA, 20 Sep 86)..... 40

Ivanov on NATO, by N. Ivanov 40
Agafonov on Pacific Fleet, by S. Agafonov 42

IZVESTIYA Reaction to Annual Japanese Defense White Book
(A. Biryukov; IZVESTIYA, 28 Aug 86)..... 44

Briefs 47
Moscow TV: Japan's Border Maneuvers

AFGHANISTAN

Moscow on Limited Soviet Withdrawal From DRA
(Moscow World Service, 7, 11 Oct 86)..... 48

Withdrawal 'Push' to Political Settlement 48
Some Reasons for Withdrawal 49

Bakhtar Political Observer on State of Rebels
(TASS, 10 Oct 86)..... 51

TASS Reports Afghan Museum Display of Chemical Arms
(TASS, 9 Oct 86)..... 53

Briefs 55
'Counterrevolutionary Band Smashed'
DRA Forces Rout 'Counterrevolutionary Gang'
TASS Reports Death of DRA Rebel 55

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

CARPATHIAN MD POLITICAL SHORTCOMINGS DISCUSSED

PM301421 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Sep 86 First Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "For Strict Party Accountability"]

[Excerpts] A session of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate Bureau heard a report from Lieutenant General Ye. Makhov, member of the Carpathian Military District Military Council and chief of its political directorate, "On the Work of the District Political Organs' Party Committees and Their Leadership in the Light of the Demands of the 27th CPSU Congress."

It was noted in the report and during the discussion that the political directorate and the political departments, in implementing the congress decisions, have started monitoring more strictly the fulfillment by communists of their regulation duties, are stepping up the role of party committees, and are making fuller use of their potential in enhancing the responsibility and discipline of party members and stepping up accountability for their vanguard role.

At the same time it was pointed out during the discussion that the demands of the 27th CPSU Congress on stepping up demands on communists for their attitude to their duty are still being implemented only slowly. An atmosphere of businesslike and self-critical sentiments, mutual demandingness, and intolerance of any deviations from the demands of the CPSU statutes has not been created in all the district's party organizations. The disciplining potential of party committees is not being fully exploited where communists--and among them leaders too--permit deviations from the demands of party and service duty, commit blatant omissions, and violate party morality.

Timely checks and party preventive work have not yet taken their proper place in the activity of party committees and the work to improve the forms and methods of checks has been poorly organized. Political organs sometimes approach these issues timidly and cautiously. Many omissions produce no reaction from the party and in some places the role of criticism has been reduced and the use of measures of party education and influence is limited.

The shortcomings that were noted can be explained to a considerable extent by the fact that a number of political organs have not yet ensured leadership of party committees in the spirit of present-day party demands, the activity of

party committees is sometimes undervalued, and concern is not shown to create the necessary conditions for their work and for the deeper assimilation of their inherent functions. Nor is account taken of the fact that most party committee secretaries are nonexempted [neosvobozhdennyye] workers and half of them have been elected to these posts for the first time, which requires that special attention be paid to their methodological training.

The Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate instructed the Carpathian Military District Political Directorate and political departments to consider the stepping up of monitoring of the fulfillment of the CPSU statutes by each communist, the observance of party, state, and military discipline, and the raising of accountability for attitudes to duty and for the honest and pure makeup of party members--particularly communist leaders--to be the main thing in leading party committees and in their activity during the restructuring of party work. The work of such an important component in the party apparatus as the party committee should be raised to a new level consonant with the spirit of this crucial stage in the party's life.

/9716
CSO: 1801/16

ARMED FORCES

TRAINER REMAINS IN BOXES AFTER TWO YEARS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by Maj G. Torzhok, Red Banner Military District, under the rubric "An Urgent Signal": "They Are Waiting For Instructions"]

[Text] It was very boring in the air regiment's classroom. Lieutenant Colonel S. Duplyakin, the instructor, monotonously presented the material on helicopter piloting and drew diagrams on the blackboard, which clearly did not interest the students.

"We have 'dawdled' over this subject so many times," Duplyakin explained. "If only we could go through it with a simulator...."

That is true. The combat training could be intensified considerably by using a flight simulator. In addition, equipment service life and aircraft fuel could be saved. Unfortunately, however, the simulation equipment has been stored away in boxes for going on 2 years. At least it is now under a canvas tent and not in the open, as it was the first 2 months after its delivery.

What is the cause of this?

"We are not in a position to provide the regiment with the additional space. We therefore have nowhere to set up the simulator," explains Lieutenant Colonel O. Petrunenko and Major V. Tkachuk, officials with the separate airfield technical maintenance battalion.

Even without going into the details, however, one cannot fail to notice that this simulator could be set up in the regiment's extremely spacious classrooms.

"We are waiting for instructions," Lieutenant Colonel Krushinin admitted. "Several commissions recently visited the regiment. Installation of the simulator was discussed. In time, a special building will possibly be built to house it."

In the meantime, the expensive equipment continues to be dead weight because of a lack of initiative on the part of those in charge. And the commanders are forced to explain to the pilots "with sign language" how to fly the helicopter in this or that situation.

11499
CSO: 1801/256

ARMED FORCES

EDITORIAL ON WORK WITH LETTERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Sep 86 p 1

[Unsigned Editorial: "We Must Improve Our Work With Letters"]

[Text] Currently, at this sharp turning point in the life of our country, under the conditions of reconstruction, the activeness of the Soviet people has sharply increased. Concerning everyone and everything, the restructuring is most closely linked with the further development of democracy and with the realization of the aspiration of the Soviet people to participate in managing the affairs of the society, state and each collective, and with their responsibility for the affairs of the country. A vivid manifestation of this is found in the letters sent to party and Soviet organs and to the editors of newspapers and journals.

It is well known how highly V. I. Lenin valued letters. "You see, these are authentic human documents! You see, I will not hear this in any report!" stated Vladimir Ilich during one of his meetings with V. A. Karpinskiy, editor of the newspaper BEDNOTA. The great leader of the revolution viewed letters as a most important source of information and an effective means of expressing public opinion and developing criticism and self-criticism and he demanded a timely and substantive response to each letter.

As our editorial mail indicates, reflections and resounding public proposals have become a distinguishing feature of recent letters. The workers and army and navy troops unanimously approved the foreign and domestic policy of the party and state, our peace loving foreign policy initiatives and the statement by M. S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, on extending the moratorium on nuclear explosions. Readers report about the restructuring, its successes and difficulties, and express suggestions and comments aimed at improving the organization of military training. They also discuss the intensification of the battle for observance of order and discipline, saving and economizing.

Military soviets, political organs, commanders and staffs should more carefully study the issues posed in these letters, and take timely and effective measures in response to critical signals from the readers. Analysis of the responses to letters sent by editors to the appropriate levels shows that, fulfilling the instructions of the 27th CPSU Congress, local officials

have begun to be more attentive to examining the statements and complaints, and are more effectively taking measures with respect to them. A stricter approach has been taken toward how proposals aimed at improving the quality of military and political training and toward achieving a moral climate in the collectives which would increase the discipline, responsibility, creativity and output of each individual.

At the same time, there are still major shortcomings in work with letters. Not everywhere is this work being given the necessary attention or is a party approach being taken. There are instances where some commanders, staffs and political organs examine the questions raised in letters superficially and do not use them fully when studying the requests, needs and frames of mind of the personnel and the moral climate in military collectives, or in improving the style of their activity. Also not eliminated is the fallacious practice of red tape, answers written for form only and sending letters to the officials about whom the complaints refer. Statements are not always objectively checked and the times set for their examination are not always met.

Personal communication with subordinates on questions of interest to them, holding consultations at the place of work and duty and visits to local areas to look into letters and statements have not yet entered widely into the practice of all officers and leaders. The results of checks are not always relayed to the personnel. And you see, all this indicates that not everyone has, and not always is there, enough true closeness to people or attention to their needs and requests. Confronted with such an attitude, people lose trust in justice and are forced at times to appeal to central organs and the press on questions which should have been effectively solved locally.

Thus, in March Sr Lt N. Semenov, a battery commander from the Odessa Military District, wrote to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA about shortcomings in the storage of automotive and other equipment in his unit, and the irresponsible attitude toward this on the part of the command. His letter was sent to the district political directorate. After a few months the officer again appealed to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA and reported that the commission which was operating in the unit based on his signal had not given an objective evaluation of a single one of the issues which he had raised. The situation remained as before.

In the majority of instances, those who write to various levels are guided by a true intention to correct matters, bring order and suggest a way out of a situation which exists, and in so doing display their social maturity, high principles and, at times, even civic courage. But the atmosphere of restructuring, expanding openness and intensifying criticism has also been exploited, the facts indicate, by people whose aim is to slander honorable people, throw a shadow on their service and conduct and even simply settle scores. The rancor of spiteful individuals and slanderers should be uncovered and public opinion should be used to give them a decisive rebuff.

Unfortunately, the editor's mail still contains numerous letters which indicate the indifference and callousness of some officials. Thus, officers and warrant officers who have been discharged into the reserves sometimes wait months for their personnel records, which despite numerous requests are still not sent to the military commissariats. Some officers in military

commissariat offices, in turn, are criticized for bureaucratism and an inattentive attitude toward visitors, especially war veterans. In some units there is a lack of concern about material and medical support for servicemen and their families.

Letters which contain suggestions and criticism aimed at further raising the qualitative indices in military labor, heightening the combat readiness of units and ships and improving the organization of socialist competition and indoctrination efforts among the personnel warrant particular attention. Thorough analysis of these letters, resolute elimination of shortcomings and the introduction of proposals which are of practical interest will help further improve the training and indoctrination process and fundamentally strengthen military discipline.

Commanders and political organs must decisively halt attempts to suppress criticism or persecute persons for making such criticism, and give such instances a principled party assessment. It is the duty of commanders, political organs and party organizations to analyze the state of work with letters in units, on ships and in establishments, organizations and training institutions, and to achieve a high sense of responsibility on the part of officials for the proper and timely examination of suggestions and criticisms which have been received, and for taking specific steps in response to each letter.

9069
CSO: 1801/13

ARMED FORCES

BRIEFS

OBITUARY: COL YE. I. ZIMIN--His military friends and comrades report with profound sadness the death of Colonel Zimin, Yevgeniy Ivanovich, a CPSU Member since 1956, deputy department chief, Central Directorate, USSR Ministry of Defense, and express their sympathy to the relatives and friends of the deceased. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Sep 86 p 4] 9069

OBITUARY: MAJ GEN V. P. ROGOVOY--The command and political department of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, and his friends and comrades, report with deep sorrow the death of Major General Rogovoy, Vladimir Petrovich, a CPSU member since 1954, and express sympathy to the relatives and friends of the deceased. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 13 Sep 86 p 6] 9069

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AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

LT GEN AVN BURAVKOV WRITES ON AIR FLEET DAY

Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian 17 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen Avn I. Ye. Buravkov, VVS [Air Force] Commander, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "Mighty Wings of the Soviet Fatherland"]

[Text] On 17 August our country marks USSR Air Fleet Day. Established by a resolution of the Soviet of People's Commissars on 20 April 1933, this holiday has become a tradition for all the Soviet people. On this day the homeland honors the creators of aviation equipment, military aviators, Aeroflot employees, DOSAAF [All-Union Voluntary Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force and Navy of the USSR] sportsmen pilots and all those who, through their selfless labor, strengthened and are strengthening the Air Fleet of the world's first socialist state.

The history of Soviet aviation and its establishment are inseparably linked with the name of Vladimir Illich Lenin. Already on the third day of the revolution at his instructions the Bureau of Commissars of Aviation and Gliders was established, which immediately embarked upon the formation of the first air detachments. The flying skill of Soviet aviators grew and their combat traditions were born at the fronts of the Civil War and in the years of foreign military intervention.

During that terrible time, for courage and valor displayed in fulfillment of combat missions, 219 pilots and aerial observers were awarded the Order of the Red Banner, 16 earned this award twice and five earned it three times. Among them are those who stood at the source of the combat path of the Transcaucasus Air Force and who took part as members of the 11th Army in the stubborn battles to establish Soviet authority in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. These included Transcaucasian pilots A. Petrenko, S. Sobolevskiy, B. Kudrin, V. Melnikov and others.

The building of socialism and the creation of a stable industrial base enabled the Soviet Union to become a mighty air power in a historically short period of time. During the 1st Five-Year Plan, Soviet pilots on Soviet aircraft accomplished a number of super-long range flights and set more than a third of the world's aviation records. The heroic epopee of the pilots who rescued the Chelyuskin Expedition in 1934 will always remain in the people's memory. Its participants, pilots A. Lyapidevskiy, V. Molokov, S. Levanevskiy, N. Kamanin,

M. Slepnev, M. Vodopyanov and I. Doronin were the first persons to be awarded the high title Hero of the Soviet Union. In July 1937 the whole world followed with delight the remarkable flight of Chkalov's crew across the North Pole to America.

Soviet aviators displayed courage, staunchness, valor and high military skill in fulfilling their international duty in the skies of Spain, China and Mongolia, at Lake Khasan and at the Khalkhin-Gol River. We take pride in the fact that among the aviator-internationalists there were representatives of the Transcaucasus. For courage and valor, pilots I. Petrov, A. Yakovenko, V. Naneyshvili, A. Osipenko and P. Denisov were awarded the high title Hero of the Soviet Union, and 43 Transcaucasians were awarded USSR orders.

All the most remarkable qualities of Soviet aviators were displayed with particular force during the fiery years of the Great Patriotic War. In fall 1941 in the skies of Moscow our pilots gained their first major victory, dispelling the myth of the invincibility of fascist aviation. The Battle of Stalingrad, during which our pilots destroyed more than 5,000 enemy aircraft, was the second major stage in gaining strategic air superiority. This feat irreversibly undermined fascist air power.

The battle for the Caucasus went down as a vivid page in the chronicle of the Great Patriotic War. In this grand engagement, which developed over the huge expanse between the Black and Caspian seas, military pilots played their role in destroying the enemy. For courage and heroism displayed in the battles for the Caucasus, 73 pilots were awarded the high title Hero of the Soviet Union. These included the glorious aces A. Pokryshkin, G. Rechkalov, P. Kryukov, V. Semenishin, V. Fadeyev and others.

The aerial warriors demonstrated exceptional bravery and valor on all the fronts of the Great Patriotic War. More than 600 times they rammed the enemy in the air. More than 350 of our pilots and crews repeated the "fiery ram" of Nikolay Gastello. Capt Nikolay Abramishvili, fearless son of the Georgian people, was one of the first to do this, in the battle for Stalingrad.

The homeland greatly appreciated the feats of its winged defenders. More than 200,000 aviators were awarded orders and medals; 2,420 of them became heroes of the Soviet Union; 65 were awarded this title twice and pilots A. Pokryshkin and I. Kozhedub were awarded the title three times.

Unfortunately, western imperialist circles studied little the results of World War II. As Comrade M. S. Gorbachev emphasized in his speech at a ceremony in Vladivostok, it must be said that militarization and a buildup of the military threat are beginning to gather speed dangerously. U. S. ruling circles and their NATO allies and accomplices are continuing to interfere in the internal affairs of many countries, are intensifying their aggressive actions against the peoples of Nicaragua and Lebanon, are continuing their undeclared war against the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] and are trying to extend their influence throughout the world.

Under these conditions, as is noted in the new edition of the CPSU Program, while the danger exists that imperialism will unleash aggressive wars and

military conflicts, the party pays unflagging attention to increasing the defense might of the USSR, strengthening its security and ensuring the readiness of the Armed Forces to destroy any aggressor.

Owing to the concern of party and people, and to successes in the development of the economy, science and technology, our Air Forces are equipped with the most modern weapons and military equipment. Supersonic, high altitude missile-carrying aircraft, equipped with the latest means of detecting the enemy, fire control and navigation and sighting apparatuses, constitute the foundation of their power. Soviet aviation possesses high mobility and maneuverability and the ability to apply various means of destruction, under any conditions of weather, time of year and time of day.

The current generation of Soviet aviators are worthy successors of the military glory of the front line pilots. They are ideologically tempered, utterly devoted to the communist cause, bold and courageous soldiers, possessing a high level of professional training. They demonstrate their loyalty to the heroic traditions in their daily, practical deeds. Many of them have earned the title Hero of the Soviet Union during the post-war period. Among them is a student from the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District, Capt. G. Yeliseyev, whose name rightfully stands in the same rank with those of the glorious front line aces.

It is now the time of intense summer military training in our district's Air Force units and subunits. Transcaucasian aviators are tirelessly perfecting their military skill and heightening vigilance, military readiness, discipline and self-discipline. Communists are setting the example in training and service. They are the nucleus which unites the military collectives and mobilizes the personnel to accident-free flying and to achieving high end results in their military labor. The best indices in socialist competition are being achieved in the collectives where officers D. Kutsokon and A. Davydov are serving. Here the most difficult military training tasks are being solved successfully, organizational and methodological work are at the required level and the morale of the personnel is high.

Many other military subunits are also in the vanguard of the competitors. The tactical flying exercises and operational flights which have taken place here have confirmed the increased professional training of flying and engineering-technical personnel and the readiness of the aviators to operate competently and with initiative in an environment most closely approximating that of combat.

Transcaucasian aviators, in a single military formation with all the troops of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District, vigilantly stand watch over the southern borders of our homeland.

9069
CSO: 1801/13

AIR/AIR DEFENSE FORCES

ARTICLES COMMEMORATE AIR FLEET DAY

Col Gen Batekhin Article

Moscow TRUD in Russian 17 Aug 86 p 1

[Article by Col Gen Avn L. Batekhin under the rubric "Today is USSR Air Fleet Day": "Glorious Falcons of a Great Power"]

[Text] The usual training flights were underway in the Red Banner Fighter Division imeni 6th Anniversary of Great October. Aircraft shot into the sky one after the other. The airmen were practicing piloting techniques. Colonel A.K. Vozov, military pilot 1st class and chief of the division political section, was completing a flight on an unfamiliar fighter. He set the landing-gear valve on "lowered," felt two jolts from behind and saw that only two of three green lights on the cockpit panel had come on. This meant that the main landing-gear struts had locked into place, while the forward strut had not emerged, had remained in the fuselage. The instructions required that the pilot eject. Aleksandr Vozov decided to save the aircraft, however, to save the work of hundreds of people embodied in it. When the pilot was unable to lower the front "leg" in emergency mode and with extra pressure, he decided to land without it. The fighter was landed faultlessly.

Even in peacetime the pilot's occupation demands self-sacrifice and sometimes real heroism. Every flight on a modern aircraft is a rigorous exam, a large and important test of moral-political and psychological qualities, physical stamina and flight skill. Time is compressed to the minimum on a flight. One cannot stop to think in the air. The pilot's thinking must be faster than the speed of the supersonic machine. And he must always make the only correct decision to be made.

The Soviet people and fightingmen of the army, air force and navy are proud of Heroes of the Soviet Union V. Gaynutdinov, G. Yeliseyev, I. Zhukov, Ye. Zelnjakov, N. Kovalev, V. Kot, V. Kucherenko, A. Levchenko, V. Pavlov, V. Pismenny, P. Ruban and V. Shcherbakov, who received this highest of awards in peacetime. Lieutenant Colonel Valeriy Ochirov, who served twice in the limited contingent of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, has made hundreds of flights in the sky over Afghanistan, extremely difficult flights demanding maximum exertion of moral and physical effort.

The unparalleled courage and skill of our Soviet Union's renowned fliers very, demonstrated especially bravely during the Great Patriotic War. In air battles and strikes at airfields our fliers destroyed 37,000 aircraft, which accounted for 62 percent of the total losses of enemy aircraft in World War II and 75 percent of the losses on the Eastern Front. The Soviet aircraft industry also passed the test, turning out 110,000 combat machines and mastering series production of 25 new types of aircraft during the war.

The defeat of fascist Germany, the Hitler's strike force, was an awesome warning and a harsh lesson for all those who are attempting to revise the results of World War II. Reactionary imperialist circles, however, primarily the USA, do not wish to accept the realities of the contemporary world and are hatching up plans for destroying socialism as a social system. The USA has begun implementing battle-ready plans and programs for building up the nuclear-missile power of the Strategic Air Command, outfitting it with more mobile, less vulnerable and highly accurate systems and equipment and with new strategic bombers. The rearmament of the air forces is also in full swing in the European NATO nations.

"Considering the complex international situation and the growing aggressiveness of reactionary, imperialist circles," M. S. Gorbachev stressed at the 27th party congress, "the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo are devoting unweakening attention to the nation's defense capability, the combat capability of the Armed Forces of the USSR and the enhancement of military discipline."

The development of the USSR's Air Forces takes into account the increased role of aviation in providing for the national defense. Missile-carrying aircraft comprise the backbone of the Air Forces. They embody the achievements of Soviet science and technology in the fields of radioelectronics and automation, aerodynamics and engine design, and technology for manufacturing and processing super-strength and heat-resistant metals and alloys.

Reactive processes in the form of important and constructive changes, influenced by scientific and technical progress, are constantly taking place in the Air Forces with a view to improving them. The technical reequipping of the aviation and the retraining of the personnel for the modern combat equipment are continuing. Operational art, tactics and combat command and control, logistical, radiotechnical and other types of flight support are being initiated, and the system of preparing command and political, flight, engineering and technical personnel.

It is not just the modern equipment which forms the backbone of the Soviet aviation. Its main strength lies in its people.

Summer combat training, a period of intensive flight work, is in full swing in the air units. All of its elements are imbued with a spirit of socialist competition with the slogan: "We shall fulfill decisions coming out of the 27th CPSU congress and reliably protect the gains of socialism"! The initiator of the competition in the Air Forces, the Guards Red Banner bomber regiment whose commander is Guards Colonel A. Labkovskiy, a delegate to the 27th congress, is out front. The experience of the outstanding personnel is making it possible to master more fully the combat capability of the aircraft systems and to enhance the socialist and working activities of the personnel.

The purposeful party-political work performed in the units and subunits plays an important role in mobilizing the personnel to implement decisions of the party congress and stimulating the human factor. Equipping themselves with the extensive, common party know-how, military councils, commanders, political officers, party and Komsomol organizations are persistently adhering to a course of accelerated improvement of the military capability of the Air Forces and making the training of the troops as close to actual combat as possible.

Loyal sons of the Soviet people, the military airmen, like all the personnel of the army and navy, are closely united round the Communist Party and its Central Committee. In single combat formation with their brothers-in-arms from the other socialist commonwealth nations, they are reliably guarding the peaceful labor of their peoples.

Col Gen Dolnikov Article

Alma Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Aug 86 p 3

[Article by Col Gen Avn G.U. Dolnikov, Hero of the Soviet Union and deputy commander in chief of the Air Forces, under the rubric "Today is USSR Air Fleet Day": "Wings of the Homeland"]

[Text] On 17 August our homeland formally celebrates a national holiday, USSR Air Fleet Day. Traditionally, this day has been one of reviewing the achievements of Soviet aviation and the successes of scientists, designers, aviation industry workers and DOSAAF members, all those whose selfless and inspired labor creates the power and the military and labor glory of the USSR Air Fleet and proves the powerful wings of the homeland.

This year, USSR Air Fleet Day is being commemorated in a special situation. Our nation is at an important turning point. The Soviet people are working to accomplish the large, complex tasks set at the 27th CPSU Congress for the nation's social and economic development and the enhancement of its defense capability.

The glorious combat path traveled by the Soviet aviation is inseparable from the heroic history of our people and their valorous Armed Forces. Its founding and development are directly linked with the name of Vladimir Ilich Lenin. He made the basic decisions on the organization of the Soviet Nation's Air Fleet, which he saw not only as an important kind of transportation and communication in peace-time but also as a powerful means of armed struggle against our enemies.

Following the civil war, in a situation of enemy encirclement and constant threat of military attack on our homeland, the Communist Party and the Soviet government, carrying out V.I. Lenin's instructions, concerned themselves constantly with building up the Armed Forces and their component, the Air Forces. The development of the air fleet was declared a national cause.

During those years new, high-speed aircraft created by the genius of G.N. Tupolev, A.A. Arkhangelskiy, S.V. Ilyushin, H.H. Polikarpov and V.V. Goryainov took to the skies over the Soviet Nation.

At its 9th congress in January of 1931, the Lenin Komsomol adopted a decision to sponsor the Air Fleet. This evoked great enthusiasm in the youth and a desire to serve in the Air Forces and work persistently to master the field of flight.

The mid-'30s were a time of air triumphs for our nation. The flights made by our pilots and the records they set evoked universal admiration. They set more than a third of the world records during those years. The people will never forget the heroic, epic rescue of the Chelvuskin crew. Those involved in it--V. Lyapidevskiy, S. Levanevskiy, V. Molokov, N. Kamanin, M. Slepnev, M. Vodopyanov and I. Doronin--were the first in the nation to receive the homeland's highest award, the title Hero of the Soviet Union.

During the fiery years of the Great Patriotic War, Soviet aviation made a worthy contribution to the defeat of fascist Germany, which had treacherously attacked our nation. Our troops did not carry out a single large operation without the participation of the aviation. It routed the enemy on land and in the air, in all the engagements and on all the fronts, interacting closely with ground forces and with the navy or independently. And the force of Soviet air strikes was constantly growing. While around 1,200 combat aircraft took part in the counteroffensive at Moscow, 4,300 participated in the Battle of Kursk, around 6,000 in the liberation of Belorussia and 7,500 in the Berlin Operation. During the war Soviet pilots carried out 3,125,000 sorties and inflicted enormous losses of personnel and equipment upon the enemy. The aviation accounted for 57,000 of the 77,000 fascist aircraft destroyed on the Soviet-German front.

The homeland gave fitting recognition to the feats of the glorious Soviet falcons: more than 200,000 airmen received state awards, 2,424 of which were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union; 66 people received the award twice; and Marshals of Aviation A.I. Pokryshkin and I.N. Kozhedub were awarded it three times. Orders of the USSR were conferred upon 897 air formations and units; 708 received honorary titles; and 228 were awarded the Guards title.

The Victory gained by the Soviet people and their Armed Forces convincingly demonstrated the invincible strength of our social and state system, the concepts of communism and the advantages of socialism and Soviet military art. The Communist Party was the inspirer and the organizer of all our victories. Its leadership was the source of the invincibility of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Unfortunately, ruling circles of the imperialist states learned little from World War II. Led by the United States of America, they are developing new and aggressive plans directed against the Soviet Union and the other socialist nations.

In order to render the nation safe from a surprise attack, the Communist Party and the Soviet government are taking all necessary steps to see that the combat readiness and the technical equipment of the Soviet Armed Forces measure up to the contemporary demands. The 27th CPSU Congress stressed the fact that "the defensive strength of the USSR is being maintained at a level making it possible to reliably protect the peaceful labor and the peaceful life of the Soviet people."

Thanks to the tireless concern of the CPSU for strengthening the nation's defense capability, the Air Forces have risen to a qualitatively new level. They are

outfitted with the most modern of equipment and weapons. The aviation today personifies the power of the homeland and the high level of Soviet science and technology. It has great striking power and is capable of influencing the course and outcome of large operations both on land and in naval theaters of military operations.

Missile-carrying aircraft constitute the backbone of the Air Forces. These are complex combat systems with good aeronautical engineering, armed with missiles, bombs and guns, with radioelectronic sighting and navigational equipment and automatic control systems. The military aviation has now acquired the qualities essential for operating successfully, such as all-weather and year-round application and the ability to gain and retain air superiority, to actively support ground forces, to destroy enemy targets without coming into range of his air defense facilities, and to carry out many other complex missions.

The equipment by itself is just one of the components of combat strength, however. It is important that these awesome weapons are in the hands of air fighters infinitely devoted to the Communist Party and the Soviet people, ideologically strong, bold and skillful. They confirm their loyalty to their military and patriotic duty with their practical deeds.

The summer combat training is now in full swing. The military airmen are steadily perfecting their military skill and enhancing vigilance and combat readiness, discipline and organization. The number of outstanding airmen, excellent sub-units and units, highly rated specialists, masters of aerial combat and combat application is steadily growing in the Air Forces. Among those out front in the socialist competition in the first year of the 12th five-year period are the military collectives headed by Colonel A. Bezrukhikh and Lieutenant Colonel R. Khayrtdinov, Guards Colonel A. Labkovskiy and Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Tarusov, Colonel V. Labezzy and Lieutenant Colonel V. Ovsyannikov, and Colonel A. Seregin.

Workers in the Orders of Lenin and the October Revolution Civil Aviation are commemorating USSR Air Fleet Day in a worthy manner along with the military airmen. Aeroflot flies routes to almost all of the world's nations today. An average of 100 million Soviet people are its passengers every year, and the total length of the air routes exceeds a million kilometers.

The Soviet homeland has developed its powerful wings thanks to the tireless concern of the Communist Party. The military airmen are responding to this concern by further enhancing their combat readiness and the quality and effectiveness with which they carry out their training and combat missions, and are confidently mastering the modern weapons and aviation equipment.

On USSR Air Fleet Day the military airmen are at their battle station in a state of readiness to protect their nation against an aggressor's encroachments.

Lt Gen Zhabin Article

Vilnius SOVETSKAYA LITVA in Russian 16 Aug 86 p 3

[Article by Lt Gen Avn I. Zhabin, member of the Military Council and chief of the Political Section of Baltic Military District Air Forces, under the rubric "17 August is USSR Air Fleet Day": "The Powerful Wings of the Homeland"]

[Text] The history of the creation and development of Soviet aviation is inseparably linked with the name of Vladimir Ilich Lenin. The first Soviet air detachment, which had 12 crews, was formed and a temporary agency of control, the Office of Commissars of Aviation and Air Navigation, was established at his personal instructions on the third day of the revolution. Large-scale formation of air detachments was begun on 28 January 1918 in accordance with the Decree on the Organization of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. Their nucleus was made up of people devoted to the revolution and prepared to give their lives for it.

The Great Patriotic War was a rigorous test. Considering the danger posed by fascism's aggressive policy, the Communist Party and the Soviet government was taking vigorous steps to enhance the nation's defense capability and prevent an attack by Hitlerite Germany. The war still came down upon us unexpectedly, however.

It was an especially harsh trial for the Air Forces, in which the rearmament and the retraining of the personnel for the new equipment was still going on. Among other things, new fighters, bombers and attack aircraft had been produced just prior to the war, most of which were superior to those of fascist Germany's aircraft in many ways, and the IL-2 fighter had no equal in the world.

History had left us too little time, however. We had not managed to completely develop the large-scale production of the new aircraft or to reequip the Air Force units with them by the time fascist Germany attacked our nation. This had to be accomplished under the extremely difficult conditions of the first part of the war.

Soviet pilots, indoctrinated by the Communist Party, courageously entered the battle, demonstrating a high level of combat skill and mass heroism never before seen. While engaging in air battles, they simultaneously struck at advancing enemy tank and motorized groupings. The enemy aviation lost more than 1,300 aircraft just during the first 3 weeks of the war.

The homeland and the party properly appreciated the feats of the military airmen. More than 200,000 of them were awarded orders and medals; 2,420 of the pilots were awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union; 65 were awarded the title twice; and Marshals of Aviation A. Pokryshkin and I. Kozhedub received it three times. Orders of the USSR were conferred upon 897 air formations and units; 708 were given honorary names; and 228 were awarded the Guards title.

Following the war, thanks to the tireless concern of the party, the Air Forces rose to a qualitatively new level. They were outfitted with the most modern equipment and weapons. Missile-carrying aircraft form their backbone. These are complex combat systems with good aeronautical engineering, with bombs, missiles and guns, and automatic control systems. The airborne missiles on the modern aircraft make it possible to destroy enemy targets without entering the range of his air defense facilities. Variable-sweep-wing and vertical-take-off aircraft have been produced and received in the arsenal.

Modern helicopters, capable of destroying tanks, missile and artillery units and personnel and of putting airfields and other facilities out of operation, are a powerful combat weapon.

The CPSU Central Committee demands that we focus all our efforts on accelerating scientific and technical progress. In the army situation, this is not only resulting in improved weapons but is also considerably altering the nature of the military work. This is being brought about by a significant increase in the rate of renewal of the combat equipment and its constant modernization. The Air Forces are receiving new models of combat equipment, which embody the latest achievements in such scientific areas as microelectronics, applied mathematics and others. The acceleration of scientific and technical progress demands constant improvement on the part of Air Force personnel. They must have good special training and the ability to think broadly, on a large scale, constantly assimilating new things and adopting them in their practical work. Only that pilot is capable of taking his aircraft into the air, intercepting the target, breaking the enemy's resistance and gaining victory over him, who possesses theoretical competence and tactical art multiplied by good moral qualities. This means that the role of the moral-political and psychological conditioning is steadily growing in the contemporary situation.

Today's airmen are worthy heirs to the combat glory of the older generations. They affirm their loyalty to the heroic traditions with their daily military work, because the flying profession always demands a total effort and valor. Every flight on a modern jet aircraft is a test of the crew. The everyday activity of the Air Forces in recent years has been filled with numerous examples of heroism and self-possession of the air fighters.

The summer combat training is now in full swing in air units and subunits of the Red Banner Baltic Military District. The military airmen are taking an active part in the socialist competition with the slogan: "We shall fulfill decisions coming out of the 27th CPSU Congress and reliably protect the gains of socialism." The number of outstanding men, excellent subunits and units, highly rated specialists and masters of aerial combat is constantly growing.

Those out front in the socialist competition in the first year of the 12th five-year period are airmen of the units and subunits of officers A. Volchkov, V. Khachikyan, V. Gritsenko, G. Salnikov, A. Zhemaytis, O. Villerush, A. Radchenko, M. Belanov and other commanders and political workers.

Fulfilling the demands set at the 27th party congress and the June 1986 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations and all personnel of the Air Forces are focusing their attention on completely mastering the new combat equipment and weapons, on finding effective combat employment procedures and tactical methods, and on making maximum use of the combat capabilities of the airborne systems.

Loyal sons of the Soviet people, the military airman, like all the personnel of the Armed Forces, are always prepared to answer the first call of the party, to respond to an order from the homeland, and come to the defense of the socialist homeland and perform their patriotic and international duty.

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SPECIAL TROOPS

MORE ON RAISING EFFICIENCY OF MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Aug 86 p 2

[Article by Lt Gen N. Chekov, deputy chief for construction and billeting of troops of the USSR Ministry of Defense, under the rubric "The Construction Complex: What Should It Be Like?": "It Begins With a Plan"]

[Text] The editorial office is continuing the discussion on ways to enhance labor effectiveness in military construction projects begun on 29 March in Colonel General K. Vertelov's article "The Construction Complex: What Should It Be Like?"

We know that any construction project begins with a plan, or more precisely, with the preparation of planning estimates. It is the plan which determines what the construction site will be like: its equipment, the level of labor organization and the very "visage" of the units being erected. In other words, it is a unique and powerful lever for activating possibilities for achieving scientific and technical progress and for ensuring the efficient utilization of resources and work time, enhanced production effectiveness and quality. And the military planners have demonstrated this fact more than once on the practical level. They have worked up dozens of original plans distinguished by an innovative approach, boldness of engineering thought, precision and elegance of design.

A lot has been done in military plans in recent years to improve the quality of mass-produced plans as well. Almost half of them receive high marks from the client. Comprehensive systems for controlling the quality of designs and documents are presently being introduced into the planning-estimate technology. This will make it possible to make more extensive use of and disseminate progressive know-how, to monitor the quality of the work more thoroughly at all of the stages of planning and to improve its overall caliber and effectiveness.

We can never be satisfied with the planning-estimate situation today, however. This is primarily because, along with the high-quality documents, construction projects continue to receive a significant quantity of unfinished plans containing now the inefficient handling of the general plans, now a low construction density, incorrect determination of the estimated construction costs or even errors. The achievements of scientific and technical progress are not always taken into account, which makes it impossible, for example, to reduce the volume of construction and installation work at the construction sites and consequently, the labor-intensiveness. All of this makes the construction more expensive.

Why does this occur? The client, planning and construction, and installation organizations, enterprises of the construction industry, the operating service and scientific research organizations all help to produce every plan.

Every link in this chain influences the effectiveness of the capital investment in one way or another, since it determines what kind of planning decisions are made. Interaction and creative cooperation among all the participants in the project are therefore particularly important. In practice, however, the situation is frequently entirely different. The planners, who ensure that mandatory construction standards and rules are observed, give less attention to the development of optimal technical decisions. The clients, in turn, are unable to competently assess the quality of the planning documents they receive.

It is also very important to increase the client's responsibility. The "emergency" inclusion of this or that unit on the itemized construction list without a plan or even the basic data or assignments from the client is still creating a disaster for the planners. In addition, the planning organizations are ordinarily very late--sometimes up to a year--in receiving extracts from the itemized lists from the client. There is no time left to come up with and carefully work out solutions.

If this sort of "emergency" arose only in the construction of special projects, it could be justified and explained somehow. But some clients are up to 6 months or more late in "remembering" facilities whose construction simply had to be foreseen: housing, kindergartens, purification facilities, service systems and so forth. This harmful practice is particularly widespread in the billeting directorates of the Baltic, Transbaykal, Turkestan and Moscow military districts. Why then, one asks, are 2-year plans approved in the districts for the construction of social, cultural and personal-service facilities, not to speak of the 5-year plans established for the construction of housing?

As a result of this confusion, the stability of plans for planning projects in the districts does not exceed a level of 50-65 percent. The provision of planning organizations with planning assignments in 1985 for this year's plan for the construction and installation work amounted to only 20-35 percent as of 1 October, for example. According to the norm, it should have been 100 percent. For the year, more than 200 units have been added to the plan for the Main Military Construction Directorate, for example. These are the conditions under which the planners face the task of issuing the necessary documents within a short period of time. Can high-quality plans be provided and can the builders prepare for and start the jobs in this situation? How are they to make a plan technologically progressive, consider several alternatives, organize competitive planning...?

The improvement of planning documents depends in great part upon the effectiveness of the scientific research institutes. Despite the steps being taken, our branch science has still not become a consistent generator of new ideas which can be extensively applied by the planners. Nor is the construction industry satisfying the growing demands. The enterprises are frequently unable to apply new developments. This sort of situation has developed in the Ural, Transbaykal, Siberian and a number of other districts, where the reconstruction of prefabricated, reinforced concrete plants is proceeding at a snail's pace and not producing proper results.

The main cause of the construction industry's difficulties is the absence of an effective mechanism which would encourage the adoption of new and more intensive elements, materials and technologies. It sounds illogical, but it is still advantageous for the enterprises to operate in the old manner. The reason is not regulated by financing, after all. Triple-layer, outside wall panels, large roofing panels and much, much more have therefore still not come into widespread use at the construction sites. Furthermore, most new elements and materials offered by the designers are less expensive and materials-intensive. And this is not advantageous for the enterprises or the construction projects under the existing planning system. The infamous "gross" principle "operates" here--that is, the more expensive it is, the better.

There is a way out of this conflict: calculate the size of the wage fund and bonuses for the construction workers without considering the cost of the construction materials, on the basis of so-called "net" output. It has obviously become necessary to revise the entire system of economic indices to give participants in the construction system an interest in the end result.

These matters were brought up in all their urgency at the 17th CPSU Congress, which considered the industrial construction sector, a sample of which outlined us the task of raising the entire construction complex to a new industrial and organizational level and of increasing the responsibility of all the participants in construction.

Our present course of industrializing construction requires a further shifting of most labor-intensive production operations to the plants, which have extensive capabilities for turning out elements with a high level of in-plant finish. This is unquestionably the main direction, one which will make it possible not only to considerably increase labor productivity but also to improve working conditions for the construction workers, bringing them into closer conformity with plant conditions.

Clearly, not enough has been done in this area at the present time. Diesel electric power plants, substation transformers and certain other modular items are examples of products completely finished at the plant.

These were developed in close, creative collaboration by the productive planning organizations headed by Comrades S. Voinov, N. Pershin and V. Kolesnikov, the main construction committees and the Main Directorate of the Construction Industry. Three-dimensional blocks and three-dimensional frame modules, which are three-dimensional, reinforced concrete elements brought to a high level of completeness at the plant, are taking their first "steps" at the construction sites. The Blok comprehensive, special-purpose program calls for manufacturing and installing more than 25,000 industrially-produced modules during the current 5-year period. All of this can be regarded only as the beginning of a large and serious job, however.

In our opinion, the concept of a high-quality plan includes not just modern industrial technology today. We are faced with the task of considerably enhancing the role of planning estimates in the organization of construction and the development of economic self-sufficiency, in the adherence to construction schedules and the extensive adoption of the brigade contract.

We have serious complaints against the existing specifications with respect to the quality of the estimates. The existing, as we know, serve as the basis for planning capital investments and the main basis of the participants in construction. We have begun the development of consolidated estimate normatives, primarily the price lists. This will make it possible to considerably reduce the time required to work out the documents and to improve their quality. Automated systems for working out the estimates are also being introduced.

We attach particular importance to the role of planning organizations in the development and creation of modern construction complex, and we have therefore worked out a large number of specific norms for the 5-year period. They are aimed at the timely provision of capital construction projects of the Ministry of Defense with high-quality planning documents, the implementation of a unified technical policy in the planning of projects, the systematic adoption of the requirements of scientific and technical progress through the planning process, and the improvement of labor and material resources.

Unfortunately, it must be said that their implementation is still being drawn out, since organizations still not possess the culture of thinking and of action. It is not a rare thing for given the chief engineers of projects and the chief specialists of planning organizations, apart from the quality of the plans, devote in most part, not to their specified functions in the work. The system of material incentives for the work of the planners needs to be further improved.

We immediately activated all available reserves and to realize right now these possibilities which exist for improving the planning and estimate work - these things are dictated by the times. This is one of the reasons in the continued improvement of the construction complex we consider the efforts of the military planners and construction workers are fruitfully turned in the accomplishment of these tasks.

PLAN
State Estimate

MILITARY HISTORY

HISTORY OF STATE DEFENSE COMMITTEE DETAILED

Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jun 86 p 7

[Article by Petr Studenikin and Ivan Taranenko under the rubric "Pages of History": "In View of the Emergency: On the 45th Anniversary of the Establishment of the State Defense Committee"]

[Text] "In view of the emergency situation which has been created and for purposes of rapidly mobilizing all the forces of peoples of the USSR to repel the enemy which has treacherously attacked our homeland, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Central Committee of the VKP(b) [All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)] and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR have deemed it necessary:

- "1. To establish a State Defense Committee..."
- "2. To concentrate all authority in the state in the hands of the State Defense Committee:
- "3. To require that all party, soviet, Komsomol and military organs unquestioningly carry out decisions and orders of the State Defense Committee.

Moscow, the Kremlin
30 June 1941

From the Defense Council to the GKO [State Defense Committee]

It was the first days of the war.... Apparently, no one yet understood what a powerful strike had been inflicted upon our nation. "Rise up, vast nation, rise up in mortal combat!..." already resounded everywhere, however. The people were rousing themselves for the struggle. In the cities and villages and remote settlements, long lines of people young and old formed at the gates of the military commissariats, the party and Komsomol raykoms, long before they began their work. Columns of draftees marched along rural roads to the highways, merging like small streams into the powerful river of a nation which had risen up to defend itself.... During those first days the VKP(b) did everything possible to see that every person in the state felt and understood that at that extremely difficult time the party had not lost its nerve before the awesome enemy invasion and had assumed full responsibility for the fate of the homeland.

The decree passed by the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the VKP(b) Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR establishing the State Defense Committee was published in PRAVDA on 1 July 1941. The State Defense Committee included I.V. Stalin (chairman), V.M. Molotov (deputy chairman), K.Ye. Voroshilov, G.M. Malenkov and others. N.A. Bulganin, N.A. Voznesenskiy, L.M. Kaganovich and A.I. Mikoyan were subsequently added to its membership.

Something like it had existed before: in November of 1918, when the young Soviet Nation had faced a serious danger, when the question of whether the world's first socialist state was to be or not to be was essentially being decided. At V.I. Lenin's proposal, an important step was taken to improve leadership of the young republic's defense: the All-Union Central Executive Committee established the Workers' and Peasants' Defense Council, which was over all commissariats and revolutionary military councils (RVS). Ya.M. Sverdlov described it as "an organ of extraordinary military dictatorship," which put life in the nation "onto a military footing."

The Great Patriotic War once again placed this problem acutely onto the agenda.

Just what questions did the State Defense Committee decide? It would probably be easier to say what questions it did not decide. During the war the GKO led the entire struggle of the party and the people to build up the Red Army, convert the nation to a military footing and create a smoothly functioning and rapidly growing military economy. The GKO exercised supreme leadership--political, state and military--over all the key areas of the military economy and civilian sectors of the national economy. This rigorous centralization was absolutely essential in that extraordinary situation. It played an enormous role in the extremely rapid conversion of the nation's entire life onto a war footing. During the war, the GKO issued 9,971 decisions, which had the force of war-time laws.

The range of the GKO's activities was extraordinarily broad. It made strategic decisions and what appeared to be local decisions: decisions on the production of sleds and ordinary horseshoes, as in the Battle of Moscow, for example. It is therefore perfectly clear that it would be simply impossible to tell about this work in all its diversity in a newspaper report.

For purposes of restructuring the national economy of the USSR, N.A. Voznesenskiy, member of the State Defense Committee and chairman of the USSR Gosplan, wrote, the GKO implemented the following measures:

In the first place, it mobilized the production capacities of socialist industry, the workers, engineering and technical personnel to meet the needs of the Patriotic War....

In the second place, it mobilized the material resources of agriculture and the labor of the kolkhoz peasantry to fill the needs of the Soviet Army and of the cities supplying the front with military equipment....

In the third place, it carried out the mobilization and the wartime restructuring of the transportation system....

In the fourth place, it mobilized construction personnel and machinery for building munitions plants and collaborating enterprises....

In the fifth place, it implemented the mobilization of the workers and their re-training in industry, and the training of new cadres to replace those drafted into the Soviet Army....

In the sixth place, it mobilized the nation's production reserves for the uninterrupted provisioning of the cities.

The GKO exercised strategic leadership of the armed struggle through Headquarters, Supreme High Command, assigned military-political missions to the Armed Forces, improved their structure, distributed the leading cadres and defined the general way in which the armed forces were to be used in the war.

The Great Transfer

Literally every hour of the war brought forth urgent problems. An enormous movement of military freight to the west and of the nation's production forces to the east began during the very first days. This "great transfer," as it became known in history, was directed by the State Defense Committee.

Let us recall that the railways delivered 291 divisions, 94 brigades and more than 2 million replenishment draftees to troop concentration sites during the summer and fall. A total of 2,593 enterprises (1,560 of which were defense enterprises) were removed and 18 million people were evacuated from the front zone.

In essence, a highly developed industrial power for that time was moved thousands of kilometers. And not only were they moved, but they were set up at the new and unsettled sites and began turning out the products so needed at the front within an exceptionally short period of time.

We met with Lieutenant General I. Kovalev, former member of the GKO's Transport Committee, at his home in Moscow. During the war he was chief of the Military Transport Directorate, General Staff (UPVOSO).

"It was very difficult to evacuate the population, industry and possessions, of course," Ivan Vladimirovich recalls. "Our mobilization plan in case of war did not cover the massive evacuation. In the beginning the military command element, party and soviet organs therefore had to decide on this extremely complex matter with fear and a sense of the risk and on the basis of conscience, so to speak. A directive was distributed at the end of June, stating that everything which could be removed to the east, should be, and everything else should be destroyed. An Evacuation Council was set up with N.M. Shvernik as its chairman, and evacuation offices and committees were set up in the people's commissariats and the departments. Plants and factories were evacuated under the most difficult of circumstances. By decree of the GKO, all enterprises serving war needs were to continue producing until the last minute. Equipment was therefore very frequently dismantled under enemy shelling.

"The last 2 months of 1941 were the most difficult and critical. The enterprises had already halted production in the old areas but had not yet been

restored to operation in the new rear areas. The national economy of the USSR had suffered exceptionally extensive losses. Prior to the war 40 percent of the nation's entire population had lived in territory which the enemy occupied by November 1941, 63 percent of the prewar coal extraction took place there, 68 percent of the iron, 58 percent of the steel and 60 percent of the aluminum were smelted there, and 38 percent of the grain and 84 percent of the sugar were produced there. A total of 38 percent of the cattle and 60 percent of the hogs were located in that territory. The rail line there accounted for 41 percent of all the railways in the USSR.

"Some difficult trials awaited us," I.V. Kovalev continued. "Both victories (in the Battle of Moscow, we succeeded for the first time in the war in stockpiling ammunition on the scale of several fronts adequate for conducting a large offensive operation) and failures (the winter offensive of '41-'42 could have been crowned with far greater success if we had been able to provide for the timely movement of reserves). In short, it was necessary to further reorganize the operation of our transport system, including rail transport...."

On the night of 11 February 1942, Kovalev was invited to attend a joint session of the State Defense Committee and the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee. He was warned that he would have to report on the operation of the transport system and make suggestions for improving it. He was slightly late in arriving at the Kremlin. The GKO meeting had already begun.

"Why are you late?" I.V. Stalin asked.

Ivan Vladimirovich replied that he had been carrying out instructions from the chairman of the GKO on the shipment of tanks and other combat equipment to the Northwest Front. I.V. Kovalev was soon given the floor, and he reported on deficiencies in the organization of transportation of troops and combat equipment. He expressed the opinion of the TPKOSO that administration of the nation's transport was imperfect and suggested the establishment of a Transport Committee under the GKO, which would control all forms of transport: rail, water, motor-vehicle and air.

"Who is in favor?" the chairman asked.

Silence reigned.

"It appears that Comrade Kovalev has the support only of Comrade Kovalev," he said, smiling, lighted his pipe and continued:

"We are in the position of people who must understand that it is not just victory or defeat at the fronts which depends upon the performance of the transport system today, but the existence of our state. This is what we are dealing with, and not the creation of additional superstructure. People around him say (points at Kovalev) he can do anything. How should that be taken? It should be taken this way: there is a proposal that Comrade Stalin be elected chairman of the Transport Committee. Let us vote...."

The Transport Committee under the GKO elected at that meeting included three other members of the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee, the people's

commissars of railways and water transport, the chief of rear services for the Red Army and the chief of the UPVOSO. When Kovalev returned to the directorate, a courier was already waiting for him with the ratified documents.

The committee was able to mobilize the resources of the transport system and achieve interaction among all of its components.

Advance [Force] of the Rear

We now know that in October and November of '41, the chairman of the GKO was personally distributing sub-machine guns and other weapons for the front, for example, that the output of rolled ferrous metal without which the production of munitions is impossible had dropped 430-fold(!), that the production of bearings without which not a single aircraft, motor vehicle, tank or artillery piece could leave the plant, had been reduced 21-fold.... However, little is known about the critical situation which had developed with respect to ammunition, particularly the powder, that "bread of warfare" without which, as we know, it is impossible to fire even a shotgun.

We had enough shells and cartridges for the first months. A significant part of that ammunition was concentrated in the western regions, however, in the border areas, and was captured by the enemy. We had lost 303 ammunition enterprises by November of 1941. Those plants had produced more than 13 million shell, mine and aerial-bomb casings a month, and around 8 million fuses.... Eight powder plants had stopped production. We had succeeded in evacuating them, but they were somewhere en route.

"An extremely difficult situation had developed in the powder industry," recalled M. Raginskiy, former GKO representative at one of the powder plants. "A giant powder plant had to be built in complete secrecy within the shortest possible period of time. A 20,000-man army of builders headed by Colonel Ionna Savich Kuzmich erected the plant. He was a man of remarkable fate, whom the White Guards had twice sentenced to death by firing squad. The builders did the impossible. The first section was completed in 4 months, 2 weeks ahead of the deadline set by the State Defense Committee. A second and third section were completed 6 months later...."

It was one thing to build the enterprise, another to place it into operation. The start-up of that powder plant, the only one during the first year of the war which produced mortar and artillery charges and charges for rocket artillery, and one of the main producers of charges for large-caliber naval artillery throughout the war, was endangered twice.

The first time was when a new technology for producing powerful ballistic powder had to be developed and applied on an emergency basis. In order to avoid any sort of "bureaucratic red tape," the GKO decided to set up a special design office at the plant, which included the most prominent specialists in powder production headed by Doctor of Technical Sciences A. Bakayev. Then there came the very painful report that the American transport carrying the centralite (an essential component for the production of that powder) had been sunk by a fascist submarine. This created an extremely critical situation. Within something like a month scientists with the special design office had developed a replacement for the

centralite, which was in many ways superior to it. In America centralite was not replaced with a similar component until the '50s. And so, the most serious problem pertaining to powder production was resolved with unprecedented speed.

Another, no less important problem was resolved in the powder industry in 1943, when the Red Army was preparing for the battle on the Kursk Salient. In connection with this, the plant had been given the assignment of tripling its output of powder. A telegram arrived from the State Defense Committee: "Failure to meet the state target will result in the failure of a large operation at the front...."

Workers with the special design office succeeded in developing a new, screw-conveyor technology, which made it possible to triple labor productivity. Incidentally, certain [other] nations were able to convert to this technology after the war.

"The State Defense Committee's target," we were told by former GKO agent and party worker K.M. Khmelevskiy not long before his death, "was met ahead of schedule thanks to the labor heroism of the scientists and workers and to their extremely close collaboration."

Many years had gone by, but Khmelevskiy would never forget one of the March days in 1943. A fierce wind was ripping the roofs off the barracks and blowing people off their feet. He received a call from the plant in the morning. With a quota of 216 kilograms, Communists and rolling-press operators Akhmet Sabiryanov, Sergey Bozhya Volya, Semen Stomin and Aleksey Dyagovets had rolled out 1,200 kilograms of powder. A meeting was held on the occasion. Major General D. Bidinsky, plant director, congratulated the workers on their important victory, and A. Gusev, a party organizer of the VKP(b) Central Committee, presented them with a gift: two packages of low-grade tobacco each. This was the beginning of the movement of the "thousanders" at that plant....

How, with what yardstick, does one measure what those people did day after day? How does one measure their hatred for the enemy and their love for the homeland? There is no such yardstick. Their hatred was infinite, and infinite was their love.

Throughout the war the People's Commissariat for Ammunition received the special attention of the GKO. This was only right. The ammunition industry produced tens of thousands of kinds and types of products: multi-ton bombs and torpedos, various fuses, shells and mines, cartridges, powder, explosives.... Its production volume was enormous: 50 percent of the metal went for the production of ammunition during the war years.

The GKO involved many plants and factories of other branches in the production of ammunition. A total of 332 enterprises under various people's commissariats began producing ammunition in 1941, for example, 1,108 in 1942, and 1,300 in 1943.

Today, it is difficult, almost impossible, to imagine the extraordinarily difficult conditions and the short time (the second half of 1941 and the first half of 1942) within which the wartime restructuring of the entire national economy was effected under the leadership of the GKO. Without it, the victory in the war would have been impossible.

Those directly involved in carrying out the grand tasks which came up, agents of the State Defense Committee, told about it after the war. This large detachment of Soviet party and management workers with the GKO mandate and vested with extensive authority achieved what appeared to be impossible under extraordinarily difficult circumstances.

This is from the memoirs of V. Yemelyanov, GKO agent for tank production at one of the Ural plants (now a corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences):

"I remember well the day obkom secretary Saprykin handed me the credentials of a GKO agent, signed by the chairman of the State Defense Committee. When I received them, I still did not know what force they had. The text reminded me of the first years of the revolution. I was charged with the task of ensuring the immediate overfulfillment of the program for the production of tank hulls.

"Why am I responsible for exceeding the plan? Just who is responsible for fulfilling it?" I asked the obkom secretary.

"Apparently, the plant director. I believe, however, that the GKO agent should see to it that the targets set in the plan are exceeded. That is how it should be," he replied.

"And that is how it was. Our industry produced not just more tanks, but better machines than German industry.

"After the war was over, I read in the memoirs of H. Guderian, creator of the German armored forces: 'In November of 1941 prominent designers, industrial workers and officers came to my tank army to study the Russian T-34 tanks, which were superior to our combat vehicles.... The proposal by the front-line officers that we produce tanks exactly like the T-34 was not supported by the designers. The designers were disturbed not by the idea of imitation but by the impossibility of producing the most important parts of the T-34 rapidly enough....'

"But we also developed the KV and IS tanks, the best heavy tanks of World War II. A total of 29 models of tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces were developed and tested. It remains only for me to add that Decree No. 1, passed by the State Defense Committee on 1 July 1941, was a decree on the development of tank production...."

M. Olevskiy, former chief engineer at one of the artillery plants, recalls:

"In the spring of 1945 PRAVDA published a report by the collective of our plant to the GKO chairman on the production of the 100,000th cannon. And our industry turned out a total of 482,200 guns of all types and calibers. This was a remarkable achievement. We know that the industry of fascist Germany and all the European nations it occupied were only able to provide 102,000 guns during the war.

"I recall very well that as early as October 1941 A. Yelyan, our director, submitted to the GKO a schedule for the production of 100 cannons a day. This meant that the production of artillery weapons was being increased 18-fold. Today, after the passage of so many years, I myself find it hard to believe that this

was possible, and it is difficult to provide a single answer to the question: Why? After all, output was increased not by enlarging production capacity but mainly as a result of progressive technological steps, enthusiasm, initiative and a high level of production organization--these were the "three giants" on whose backs the success rested. During that period literally every worker, technician and engineer made some improvement, introduced something new.... I recall that 3,752 rationalization proposals were submitted just during one month of socialist all-out effort, which made it possible to outfit an additional 60 artillery equipments."

Professor S. Semin, former chief of the Aircraft Section of the USSR Commissariat of GKO agent, has the following to say:

"Prior to the war we had developed first-class aircraft for that time, but our Air Forces were in the stage of rearmament and reorganization, and the series production of these machines was just being set up. It was difficult then. Many plants had to be evacuated to the east. The VChK of the State Defense Committee did everything possible to get the greatest possible number of new aircraft produced as rapidly as possible: MIG-3, LAGG-3 and YAK-1 fighters, the IL-2 attack aircraft, the PYe-2 dive bombers and others.

"I recall with pride how regular aircraft production had been organized just 3 weeks after the arrival of trains carrying one of the Moscow aircraft plants to Siberia. Three months later, they were being produced in considerably greater numbers than before. Eleven months passed, and the plant began producing 10 times as many aircraft as it was producing prior to the evacuation. As early as 22 January 1942, thanks to the successes achieved, the RGO could pass a decree on the creation of an air reserve, Main Command. I would point out the fact that our aircraft industry provided the front with 3,200 combat aircraft in the second half of 1941, more than 21,700 in 1942, 29,900 in 1943, and more than 52,000 during the last year and a half of the war. And what was particularly important, People's Commissar A. Shakhurin recalled, was the fact that the aircraft industry was able not only to outfit the Air Forces with an adequate number of aircraft but also to totally reequip them with new types of combat equipment. The superiority of Soviet aircraft over those of the Luftwaffe was achieved under the most difficult of circumstances...."

This is how our entire nation performed. Our tanks, built under the supervision of experienced specialists and workers by the hands of boys and girls, women and old people, who had replaced their fathers and older brothers at the machine-tools, were superior to the enemy's in many respects and more of them were delivered to the front. Our aircraft flew faster, higher and further, and we ultimately had more of them than did the enemy. Our cannons were better than the Krupp cannons. Our warships successfully defeated the enemy at sea and on land.... What did this happen? It happened because our nation, placing its economy onto a wartime footing within a short period of time, was able not only to meet our own needs but also to provide a great deal of assistance in the form of weapons and equipment to nations which had entered the struggle against fascism. Commissar of Defense N.A. Voznesenskiy put it very well: "Hitlerite Germany's predatory war exploited the production forces of all continental Europe.... And the fact that capitalist Germany was totally defeated attested to that new and very great force which turned out to be the victor in the single combat with Germany. That force was the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, a socialist state of workers and peasants."

How Did the GKO Operate?

We know that meetings of the GKO were not recorded. The GKO did not set up special agencies under its direct control. Depending upon the circumstances, various committees, councils, commissions and bureaus functioned temporarily or permanently under the GKO. They were set up on an operational basis as needed in order to improve management and control of the war economy and were disbanded as soon as their immediate mission was completed.

The GKO passed the decree establishing the "Operations Bureau of the State Defense Committee" on 8 December 1942, by means of which the GKO exercised rigid control over the filling of orders for the military.

This was essential. By that time reserves and stockpiles of raw and processed materials built up in peace time had been exhausted. The problem of producing metal and fuel and increasing the output of electric energy... was acute. The needs of the front had to be met out of current output, while at the same time building up dependable supplies for further development of the war industry. The GKO's Operations Bureau exercised control over the operations of all the people's commissariats of the defense branches of industry, the People's Commissariat of Railways and many others.

Such control over financial discipline and the filling of orders for the military, exercised strictly and in accordance with the wartime laws, made it possible to establish the conditions necessary to implement all of the decrees passed by the State Defense Committee.

But just how did the GKO operate?

Chief of General Staff A.M. Vasilevskiy writes in his memoirs that throughout the war, strategic decisions delivered to the forces in the form of directives from Headquarters were discussed by the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the State Defense Committee, which exercised total leadership of the armed struggle and the work in the nation's rear area, enlisting the necessary, responsible military and civilian workers in each specific case.

As a rule, the preliminary outline of a strategic decision and the plan for implementing it was worked out at the GKO chairman's [office] within a narrow circle of people. Ordinarily, these were certain members of the Central Committee Politburo and the GKO. This work frequently took several days, during which the GKO chairman obtained the necessary information and advice from commanders and members of the military councils of the fronts involved and from responsible workers in the People's Commissariat of Defense. An enormous amount of work was performed during that period by responsible workers in the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff. Following thorough discussion, a decision was adopted and a plan approved for implementing it, appropriate directives were written up for the fronts, and a date was designated for a meeting between Headquarters and the commanders to be involved in carrying out the planned operations. Preparations were then carried out for their execution. Headquarters would send its representatives to those sectors, who bore full responsibility for the conduct of the operations under the wartime laws.

Approximately the same procedure was adhered to for the accomplishment of national economic tasks. In this case, the GKO in its work relied upon the organization of the Council of People's Commissars and the USSR Gosplan, and upon GKO representatives at the sites. The latter were the first secretaries of the central committees of Union republic Communist parties, kraykoms and gorkoms, and local city defense committees (these were set up in Leningrad, Sevastopol, Tula, Rostov, Stalingrad and Kursk--more than 60 cities in the nation in all). They combined all military and civilian authority in their hands. The People's Commissariats of Defense and the Navy were the GKO's working organs in military matters. The GKO directed the national struggle in enemy-held territory through the Central Staff of the Partisan Movement set up in 1942....

General A.V. Khrulev, chief of rear services for the Red Army, wrote that there were no GKO sessions in the conventional sense--that is, with a specific agenda, secretaries and minutes. The procedure of coordinating things with Gosplan, the people's commissariats and departments was simplified to the maximum degree. Members of the GKO who reported on the prepared drafts of decrees, each in his own area of work, entered the GKO chairman's office freely. It was also visited by people's commissars and other officials, not just when summoned but also at their own initiative, when they had urgent questions. All of this contributed to the overall effort to create everything necessary for the front, for the defeat of the enemy at whatever cost....

This is how the GKO operated during the war years. Naturally, depending upon the situation, deviations from this procedure were sometimes permitted: extremely important matters were sometimes decided immediately, by telephone. There were deviations, A.M. Vasilevskiy stresses, but one thing remained immutable: when working out strategic plans or resolving extremely important economic problems, the Politburo of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the State Defense Committee always relied on the collective intellect.

And so, the State Defense Committee was an extraordinary, higher state organ which coordinated the enlistment and the efficient use of the nation's military resources and implemented its decisions by means of state establishments, party and public organizations. Its functioning would have been impossible without that support. The GKO had an extraordinarily wide range of activities. It had enormous responsibility and enjoyed practically unlimited power, but it did not have its own staff or its own administrative and technical organization.

The GKO was able to successfully accomplish the extremely complex tasks and perform the enormous amount of work primarily because it operated in close contact with and relied upon the authority of the VKP(b) Central Committee and its Politburo. Its scope, its high level of organization and efficiency, its ability to identify the main problem in a complex situation and concentrate efforts to resolve it as rapidly as possible, and its precise monitoring of performance, which were inherent in the work of the GKO, enabled it to exercise the kind of leadership in the bloody war which led our people to the great Victory.

The Great Patriotic War lasted 1,418 days. We know the price at which we achieved victory in that most difficult and cruel war ever experienced by our nation. We

gained total victory--military, political, economic and ideological--over a powerful enemy. We also know the sources of that great Victory. The most important one was the fact that our people trusted the party, which had assumed leadership of that inconceivably difficult struggle, and the party trusted the people and could therefore rouse them to unprecedented steadfastness and self-sacrifice for the sake of the great Victory.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA VIEWS NATO CONVENTIONAL WAR SCENARIOS

PM081555 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3-4 Oct 86 Second Edition

[3 Oct 86 p 3]

[Part one of two-part article by Candidate of Military Sciences Colonel V. Alekseyev, "based on foreign press material" and published under the rubric "In the Staffs and Armies of Imperialist States": "'Conventional' Wars and Ways of Waging Them" -- first paragraph and capitalized passages within slant-lines printed in boldface]

[Text] As always, the U.S.-NATO command still relies on nuclear weapons in the event of a general war. A limited war, beginning with the use of conventional means of attack, is, as before, perceived by it as the initial phase of a "limited" nuclear war. Nevertheless, judging by the course of exercises by NATO Allied Armed Forces, it is believed that the duration of the non-nuclear period is growing. This is determined, people in NATO declare, by the evident growth of the strategic and operational mobility of the bloc countries' armed forces, the adoption of the concept of "follow-on forces attack," the arming of troops with new high-accuracy weapons, and so on. Changes are also taking place in views on the forms of strategic and operational use of armed forces in different theaters of military operations.

I. Combined-arms Operations

The experience of major exercises by U.S. Armed Forces and NATO Allied Armed Forces held in the last few years shows that the /STRATEGIC OPERATION/ is the basic form of the strategic use of these forces in theaters of military operations. It is considered that the political goals of a limited war in Europe could be achieved as a result of the very first strategic operation in the main--the Central European--theater of military operations, operations in other European theaters of military operations, and naval operations in the Atlantic.

A strategic operation consists of offensive and defensive operations by army groups, battles, strikes, and combat actions by units (formations) from different branches of the armed forces, all of which differ in their nature and scale but are intercoordinated. Commands and troop groups have been set up even in peacetime, operational supplies to theaters of military operations are being improved, communications systems are kept in operational standby status, ammunition arsenals have been established, and so on, in order to prepare for and conduct strategic operations. The NATO supreme allied commander Europe has under his command in the Central European theater of military operations

the Northern and Central Army Groups consisting of 23 divisions, most of which, in line with the "forward borders" [peredovyye rybchey] concept, are deployed in regions bordering directly on socialist countries, and the 2d and 4th Allied Tactical Air Commands which consist of more than 1,600 combat aircraft and 72 launch installations for Pershing-1a missiles. These forces comprise the first operational echelon. It is planned to create a supreme commander's reserve in the course of the strategic deployment of forces (just before or during the initial period of a war). As can be seen, the entire Central European theater of military operations (mainly FRG territory) has been turned into a bridgehead for attacking socialist community countries using a deployed and combat-ready grouping completely supplied with the latest combat equipment.

The NATO leadership makes no distinction between offensive and defensive strategic operations. It is considered that, in the event of adverse conditions for the bloc in the development of an offensive, a strategic operation in the theater of military operations could begin by conducting defensive actions on a tactical or even operational scale, but the evolution of these actions into strategic defense is ruled out. Therefore, the question of waging combat actions to hold the strategic border along the Rhine, as envisaged in previous plans, has not been discussed at all by the NATO command in the last few years. Meanwhile, the permissible depth of "enemy" penetration of NATO defenses during exercises held in the last few years has not been in excess of 70 km.

The underlying cause of this approach is obvious. Way back in the early seventies West German military-political figures declared that in their view "a NATO strategy allowing the possibility of loss of FRG territory is unacceptable." They insisted on the adoption of the "forward borders" concept, which became an important component of bloc strategy envisaging the switch of combat actions to enemy territory from the very start of an armed conflict.

The experience of operational and combat training of NATO Allied Armed Forces shows that the bloc command perceives operations by army groups as the basic form of effective use of ground forces in the Central European theater of military operations, while the basic form in the flank (North European and South European) theaters of military operations is provided by operations by allied ground forces in individual regions (zones) which, in terms of their objectives and the nature of tasks to be performed, could be offensive and defensive.

It is planned to conduct /ARMY GROUP OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS/ for the purpose of hitting the main frontline forces of the enemy's first echelon and capturing important economic regions and administrative-political centers in the territory of one or more Warsaw Pact states.

Depending on the conditions in which war is unleashed, an army group could move on to the offensive either at its peacetime strength with minimal reinforcements (up to 15 divisions), or could launch combat actions after the mobilization and transfer of troops from the United States, Britain, and Canada. Even in peacetime formations and units of the Northern and Central Army Groups are stationed in the direct vicinity of the regions of their operational destination, which ensures the swift formation of strike groupings to deliver the main strikes in the selected directions.

The operational structure of an army group on the offensive usually comprises two echelons. The first includes all combat-ready formations (up to 70 percent of forces and facilities) for the purpose of delivering a powerful initial strike, breaching the enemy defense, and performing immediate tasks. The second echelon, as a rule, is formed in the course of the operation itself from formations constituting the army group commander's reserve and transferred from the NATO supreme allied commander's reserve to the theater of military operations. It is intended to build up efforts in the main direction and also to replace formations which have suffered major losses. An army group offensive is planned to begin following a mass strike by high-accuracy weapons which, in line with the "follow-on forces attack" concept, is assumed to be delivered throughout the depth of operations. The object of the strike is to simultaneously hit the enemy's nuclear attack means, disrupt his command system, strike the most important groupings, thus thwarting the deployment of first echelons and the advance of reserves, and create breaches for advancing troops.

Foreign military specialists single out the Berlin salient in the zone of the Northern Army Group. It is there that the most combatable formations of the 1st West German and 1st British Army Corps, with tank units as their core, are deployed in the course of exercises. The same salient is also assigned to the 3d U.S. Corps which, judging by the experience of exercises in the last few years, is created from reinforcement troops transferred from the United States. The Leipzig salient is singled out in the zone of the Central Army Group. The strike grouping deployed here during NATO Allied Armed Forces exercises includes formations from the 3d West German and 5th and 7th U.S. Army Corps.

The creation of a six-fold superiority in forces and facilities along narrow breakthrough sectors is seen as a decisive condition of success in an offensive. In order to achieve this superiority, the NATO command plans primarily massive use of the fire power of first-echelon army corps and the bulk of support aircraft in these sectors. In other words, reliance is placed not on timely concentration of forces and facilities in the breakthrough sectors, as in the past, but on the creation of superiority for conducting fire strikes against the enemy and maneuvering troops along the front line and from the deep rear. In the opinion of NATO military specialists, the fast advance by armor, tank, and mechanized formations is to be secured through the wide use of tactical and operational landings, constant radioelectronic jamming of the enemy intelligence and command system, skilled disinformation, and direct support for troops by tactical aircraft.

An /ARMY GROUP DEFENSIVE OPERATION/ could take place either at the start of strategic operations in the theater of military operations or while they are in progress. It is important to bear in mind that in the last few years the NATO command has been assigning its defense the task of not only thwarting and halting an enemy offensive but also of inflicting on him strikes which would create favorable conditions for its own troops to launch a counteroffensive. Moreover, great attention is given to "deep strikes" in the organization of defense and in offensive operations.

As a rule, during NATO exercises in the last few years, the groups would start defensive operations at their present strength with reinforcements reinforcements. The NATO command proposed it this time the opinion that the advancing "enemy" in the Central European theater of military operations has failed to break through over the forward border. Moreover, during the very same exercises, NATO forces "inflicted defeat and finally ousted the advancing enemy" in the course of 6-7 days. According to the exercise plan, this was to be followed by counterstrikes and move to the offensive.

This is briefly the content of combined-arm operations where the command of the aggressive NATO bloc is preparing to wage. The first attack will deal with air force and naval operations.

[4 Oct 86 p.5]

[Part two of two-part article by candidate of military sciences Colonel V. Alekseyev under the rubric "In the Staffs and Arms of Imperialist States": "Conventional" War and Ways of Waging Them: V. (Air Force and Naval Operations)]

[Text] NATO strategists believe that without supremacy in the air, troop transfers and the deployment of the NATO allied armed forces will be impossible, and without air superiority it will be impossible for all branches of the armed forces to successfully carry out strategic operations.

The main ways in which the NATO allied air forces are used operationally in a conventional war are air offense and air defense operations. Experience of annual exercises of the "Central Enterprise" or "Cold Fire" type show that air offense operations are conceived as having extremely ambitious goals that graphically reflect the aggressive nature of this imperialist bloc: destroying the enemy's main air forces and air defenses, inflicting deep strikes against its reserves, breaking lines of communication, and disorganizing troop control. Air offense operations may be carried out within the framework of a strategic operation both at the start of and during military operations. Up to 80 percent of all combat-ready aircraft in a theater of military operations may be involved in an air offense operation. The operation's main tasks are to gain (maintain) air superiority, provide direct air support for ground forces, and isolate the combat operation zone.

The NATO command understands air superiority to be the achievement of a situation in the air (at a certain time and in a stipulated area) whereby its ground forces, naval forces, and aircraft are able to successfully carry out their combat tasks. It is planned to ensure air superiority through aerial combat and strikes against airfields and enemy air force ground installations and air defenses. To this end it is planned to use cruise and ballistic missiles and F-111, F-15, F-16, F-4, and Tornado aircraft.

Providing direct air support is one of the most important tasks for tactical aviation. During the "Cold Fire" exercise between 150-250 flights a day were carried out on behalf of the Army Corps. Strikes against "enemy" ground forces and targets were carried out up to a depth of 50 km by A-10 and Alpha Jet ground-attack aircraft, Jaguar, Harrier, and Tornado fighter-bombers, F-16's, and other combat aircraft.

Isolating the combat operation zone within the framework of an air offense operation also carried out by tactical aviation means preventing the timely introduction into the fighting of the enemy's second echelon (reserves), limiting its troop maneuverability, and disrupting supplies of materiel.

It is planned to resolve the combat tasks facing NATO's aviation in an offensive operation by inflicting two or three massive strikes in several sectors. It is planned to involve most aircraft in the first strike in conjunction with cruise and ballistic missiles and reconnaissance and strike complexes. The main aim of the strike, carried out on the basis of a unified concept and plan, is to hit the enemy's most dangerous groupings--primarily its air defense and air force means and installations. Experience of NATO exercises in the Central European Theater shows that there are two echelons--anti-air defense and strike--in the operational-tactical composition of an air grouping conducting a massive strike in a certain sector. The first echelon neutralizes the enemy's air defenses in the flight path of the second echelon aircraft, which resolve the main tasks of the operation.

The second and subsequent massive strikes are inflicted to reinforce and develop the results of the first.

Air defense operations, in the opinion of the NATO command, will be carried out with a view to repulsing massive enemy air strikes and providing cover for the main groupings of NATO troops and important military-economic, administrative, and political centers in the theater of military operations. It is believed that the implementation of operations will be promoted by the allied air force organizational structure that has been created in the Central European Theater--a structure which envisages centralizing control of both tactical aviation and air defense systems and subordinating them to a single commander. Thus, the commander of the NATO Allied Air Forces in this theater is simultaneously commander of the Central Air Defense Zone, and the commanders of the 2d and 4th Allied Tactical Aviation Commands are also commanders of their corresponding air defense regions. Foreign military specialists believe that combining these jobs makes it possible to flexibly retarget tactical aviation for resolving both offensive and defensive tasks and makes it easier to organize cooperation between aircraft and ground-based air defense installations and to control them during operations.

According to foreign press figures, in total the forces and means of the Central and Atlantic Air Defense Zones, the national air defense systems of France, Spain, and Portugal, the military air defenses of the Northern and Central Groups of Armies [SGA i Tsga], and tactical aircraft from the 2d and 4th Allied Tactical Aviation Commands and the national air forces of Britain, France, Spain, and Portugal may be involved in air defense operations in the Central European theater.

NATO headquarters has already planned the first operations by ground and air forces against the Warsaw Pact states. The Western press has cited calculations of a number of potential prime stationary and mobile targets located at depths of up to 800 km. The targets defined in most detail are those 300 km from the FRG border with the GDR and CSSR. It is noted that in a border strip up to

30 km wide on the territories of these socialist states around 830 mobile and more than 30 stationary targets (bridges, railroad stations, road junctions, warehouses, control centers, major electronic installations, and others) are planned as prime strike targets. It is planned to hit the aforesaid targets in this strip using ground forces and tactical aviation firepower. NATO specialists believe that at a depth of between 30-100 km there could be over 130 mobile and 50 stationary targets, and between 100-300 km there could be up to 420 mobile and 200 stationary targets vulnerable to strikes mainly by aircraft and reconnaissance strike complexes.

During strategic operations in a theater of military operations the NATO command plans to carry out naval operations primarily with the help of the NATO strike fleet in the Atlantic. This--so the bloc command claims--is the most combat-ready and highly maneuverable operational formation of NATO naval forces in the region. Its main tasks are to gain supremacy in the most important areas of the Atlantic and in the Norwegian and Barents Seas, on which the achievement of the aims of the strategic operation in the theater depends; to defend the "Atlantic bridge," across which in a "crisis period" and during military operations troops from the strategic reserves, arms, and so forth would be transferred from America and Canada to Europe; to provide support for assault landings and participate in the defense of its own seaboard against assault landings; and to provide direct air and naval support for the bloc's ground forces in the North and Central European Theaters.

The strike fleet's main combat formation is the carrier strike group, which usually comprises 3-4 multipurpose aircraft carriers, 1-2 antisubmarine aircraft carriers, and other types of ship. The flattops can carry up to 330 warplanes, including 160 that are nuclear-capable. During exercises the main areas for aircraft carrier maneuvers are the Norwegian and North Seas and the Bay of Biscay. It is planned to allocate carrier strike groups offensive tasks: inflicting mass strikes by deck-borne aircraft against groups of enemy ships with a view to routing them at sea or at base; providing support for ground forces in maritime sectors and for marines during assault landings and combat operations ashore; and destroying and removing enemy submarines from the forward antisubmarine zones.

These tasks are rehearsed each year at exercises. This year they were rehearsed during the major "Northern Wedding '86" exercises in September. Around 35,000 servicemen, 150 surface ships and submarines, and hundreds of warplanes went into action in a region encompassing the northeast Atlantic, the English Channel, the North Sea, and the Baltic. The exercises ended with a major assault landing on the Norwegian and Danish coasts.

During the naval operations great attention is devoted to the defense of sea (ocean) lanes. In resolving this task it is planned to make extensive use not only of naval (particularly carrier) forces, but also base patrol aircraft, tactical aviation, and AWACS aircraft.

Thus, alongside the expedited militarization of the United States and the entire NATO bloc the preparations for them to unleash and wage both nuclear and conventional wars are well under way. The adventurism of the U.S.-NATO

strategic directives geared to inflicting massive deep strikes during offensive operations, gaining air superiority, and establishing supremacy at sea, is obvious. Accompanied by a whipping up of tension, this policy is based on dangerous delusions--an underestimation of the USSR and its allies and an underevaluation of their potential--born of technological arrogance.

As M.S. Gorbachev has stated, "today it is simply suicidal to base relations between states on the illusion of achieving superiority in the terrible tools of destruction." Our country is putting forward proposals to eliminate nuclear weapons worldwide by the year 2000--proposals which wholly accord with the demands of the time. The Soviet Union and the other Warsaw Pact participants have submitted a range of measures for reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. And that is the only path to peace and security.

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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

IZVESTIYA COMMENTS ON NATO GROUND, U. S. NAVAL EXERCISES

Ivanov on NATO

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Sep 86 p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent N. Ivanov]

[Text] According to tradition, fall is the time for maneuvers by the NATO countries and their allies. At this time the Pentagon military machine and NATO headquarters are placed in operation in many areas of the world. But never before, it seems, has it been revved up so high as this year, which has been declared the International Year of Peace. A demonstration of military force unprecedented in scale is going on in the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, in direct proximity to USSR borders, and operations are being worked out within the framework of the "new ocean strategy," which is frankly aggressive in nature. Might this even be considered the "contribution" of the imperialists to the International Year of Peace, and their response to peaceful Soviet initiatives?

Atlantic Ocean: "Under the Din of a NATO 'Wedding'"

For three weeks the canonade off the shores of Scandinavia did not fall silent. Drowning out the whine of tanks, Phantoms swept past and helicopters droned, searching for the periscopes of "Soviet submarines," and in the coastal forests marines beat back the attacks of the Reds.

So transpired the NATO maneuver "Northern Wedding-86." Never in postwar years has such an accumulation of NATO troops been seen in these areas.

A marine assault landing took place in southern Norway. Subunits of the U. S. Marine Corps 4th Amphibious Bde occupied a coastal bridgehead in the area of Sannefjorden. British and Dutch units occupied a coastal bridgehead in the Larvik [sic -- Narvik] area. During this many-day long phase of the maneuvers, which had the independent title "Blue Fox," approximately 12,000 servicemen were concentrated in southern Norway. Simultaneously, in the Tromso area of northern Norway, American and Canadian subunits operated in another phase of maneuvers -- "Brave Lion." The highlight of the strategic

concept was the appearance of the American aircraft carrier Nimitz, accompanied by two dozen NATO ships. As one might expect, this armada with its might and fire support "helped stop the advance of the "Reds" and defeated the "operation to seize Norway." The "victory" of NATO weapons in this instance was complete, a fact about which the generals proudly informed the journalists.

As the newspapers note, the bloc command attempted to test its troops "in action," i.e., in repulsing a "Soviet threat." A representative of the Norwegian army explained in detail: "It was important to learn how quickly our allies would come to our assistance." The commander of the American Nimitz aircraft carrier was more specific. He defined the objective of "Northern Wedding" in this way: "We had to show our flag in the North Atlantic." Speaking about the scale of the maneuvers, observers remarked that in the last 30 years this was the first time that the Atlantic powers had carried out an assault landing simultaneously in Denmark and Norway. The northern, Norwegian and even the Baltic seas were turned into a huge training ground, where NATO military ships hunted for "enemy submarines." This was one of the main aspects of the naval exercises. A total of 35,000 military personnel, more than 150 naval combatants and more than 500 aircraft took part in the maneuvers.

As we see, the NATO generals played "Northern Wedding" with great scope, not taking into account costs and losses. Although there were losses. DAGBLADET reported that two helicopters collided on the first day of maneuvers and 10 American servicemen perished. In the Tromso area a fighter launched from the Nimitz crashed. But, judging by everything, the designers of the maneuvers were satisfied with the "positive balance" of the games.

Recently, Norway has repeatedly become a place where NATO has performed anti-Soviet spectacles employing all branches of arms. The Northern Wedding-86 exercises surpassed the others not only in scale, but also in their provocative nature. It is not enough that they were held in close proximity to Soviet borders. The designers of the maneuvers at the same time attempted to throw a shadow on Soviet foreign policy and on the desire of our country for good relations with its neighbors. You see, the exercises were depicted as though the Atlantic partners had to repulse a "Soviet attack against Norway." It is hard to imagine anything more blasphemous.

The demonstration of force organized by NATO, noted P. Korichinski, leader of the Norwegian Left Socialist Party, is an attempt to change Norwegian and Danish policy, which refuse in peacetime to deploy on their territory nuclear weapons, foreign troops and military bases. An attempt is being made through military maneuvers to prevent the implementation of the widely supported idea of creating a nuclear free zone in northern Europe.

Agafonov on Pacific Fleet

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Sep 86 p 5

[Article by IZVESTIYA correspondent S. Agafonov: "Pacific Ocean: Where the New Jersey is Headed"]

[Text] During the past month, Japanese television news summaries have recalled segments from reporting about the review of the U. S. 7th Fleet in the Pacific Ocean.

To be accurate, it is still going on. The names of ships flash by, ship classes and their displacement, main armaments and crew size are named... According to the newspaper calculations the Pentagon armada presently involved in the Far East is comparable in its level of concentration only with the times of the Vietnam War. Two aircraft carriers (Carl Vincent and Ranger), the modernized battleship New Jersey, missile cruisers, destroyers, frigates, amphibious assault ships and electronic intelligence ships represent the concentrated force of the Pentagon in the western Pacific.

On what occasion and for what purpose has this squadron been assembled? The answer is simple. It is discussed openly. Washington is rehearsing war against the Soviet Union and demonstrating its military might. Among the "training programs," which are being worked out in the largest maneuvers in recent years, writes YOMIURI SHIMBUN, are mentioned operations for attacking the Soviet coast, controlling sea lines of communication in the Sea of Okhotsk and Sea of Japan and blockading operations by the Soviet Pacific Fleet. As correspondents note, the current exercises are the first practical measure to implement the "new ocean strategy" adopted early this year.

In summary form its content was given in an article in the newspaper ASAHI, [SHIMBUN] compiled from quotes by American diplomats. "The new ocean strategy," wrote ASAHI [SHIMBUN], "assumes combat operations against the USSR in the areas of the Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan, the East China Sea, the northwestern part of the Pacific Ocean, the North Atlantic and the eastern Mediterranean. According to doctrine, even in a conventional war situation, the American side must make a first strike against Soviet strategic submarines and surround USSR territory from the sea with carrier task forces and ships equipped with Tomahawk cruise missiles, in order to achieve superiority of American nuclear forces over the Soviet Union. Plans have been worked out in the event it is necessary to conduct assault operations on the Soviet coast and the Kuril Islands."

Recent statements by Vice Admiral Hostetler and State Department official Solomon indicate that the above-mentioned Pentagon ocean strategy is an integral part of a global foreign policy doctrine oriented on creating two fronts in the event of conflict with the USSR -- in Europe and the Far East. The first strike capability on the European continent is supplemented by a

first strike capability in the Asiatic-Pacific Ocean region. The objective? It has remained the same for Washington for decades: to achieve military superiority, destroy strategic parity and place reliance on force. The American squadron entered Far Eastern waters under these banners.

Discussing the overall context of current U. S. naval operations in the Far East, Japanese newspapers direct attention to the coordinated nature of Pentagon actions in the Pacific Ocean and of NATO in the North Atlantic and Baltic Sea.

In this regard, the official position in Tokyo is cause for sharp concern by progressive forces in Japan. The actual complicity of the Nakasone cabinet in Washington's provocative policy is becoming a subject of ever sharper criticism.

9069
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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

IZVESTIYA REACTION TO ANNUAL JAPANESE DEFENSE WHITE BOOK

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 28 Aug 86 p 5

[Article by A. Biryukov, TASS political observer, under the rubric "Behind the Scenes of Events": "'White Book'--Black Plans"]

[text] The Japan Defense Agency (UNO) recently published the latest "White Book on Defense," which was approved by the government. Coming out in a situation of growing worldwide hope for improvement of the international climate, as the agency Kyodo Tsusin states, it clearly smells of "cold war." The entire contents of the document indicate that Japan's ruling circles view that nation's role within the framework of the policy of military-political confrontation conducted by Washington in the Asian and Pacific Ocean region.

"Inflating the myth of the "Soviet military threat," the authors attempt to justify the effort being made in Japan to build up its military strength beyond the limits set in the current military program. Artificially lowering figures on the growth of the Japanese armed forces and military allocations, they reiterate without proof statements about an increase of some sort of "hidden" threat on the part of the USSR. Presenting the facts upside down, so to speak, the compilers of the "white Book" state that "one of the priority tasks of state policy" of the Soviet Union is to "build up its military might." The USA, however, they assert, is only striving for a balance of forces with the USSR at a lower level and endeavoring to accomplish realistic, fair and verifiable control over weapons and disarmament." In addition, they describe the "Star Wars" program (SDI), the most dangerous offspring of the U.S. administration, one capable of destroying the entire system of limitations on the arms race and one to which Japan is being drawn to align itself with, as aimed, they say, at "eliminating nuclear weapons."

One has to be amazed at such a biased, at the very least, assessment of the situation by Japanese military figures. It is as though they were unaware that since the end of World War II, the USA has pursued a course of military confrontation with the USSR, with forces of peace and social progress, including those in the Asian and Pacific Ocean region. The atomic bombs dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were only the heralds of that course, based on a cult of force, which has been personified in nuclear weapons. Not the USSR, but the USA, has conducted the two largest wars in that area since 1945--in Korea and Indochina--and hatched up plans for a nuclear strike against a number of states. And it is the USA which, since the mid-'70s, has taken large-scale steps there to build up its armed forces, turning them into the second most powerful grouping outside that nation.

what kind of "balance" and its "destruction" by the Soviet Union are the authors of the document talking about? About the fact, perhaps, that the USA has one aircraft-carrier groups in the region, while the USSR has none? Or about the fact that there are more than 100 American military bases and support points there, while the USSR has none? Or perhaps about the fact that American nuclear weapons are deployed throughout the region, including the territory of certain allies of the USA, while the USSR has none outside its national territory? No, the USA is striving not for a balance of power with the USSR, but for military superiority. Those in Washington are striving not for control over weapons and for disarmament but for a build-up of military power, primarily nuclear power, ignoring [the danger] this poses for all of the states it has chosen as its hostages. Let us recall just the address by R. Solomon, head of the U.S. State Department's Political Planning Council, who stated to cadets at the Naval Academy: "The enhancement of the offensive power of our forces in the Asian and Pacific Ocean region, the deployment of F-16 fighter-bombers at Misawa [Air] Base in Japan and the outfitting of ships of the 7th Fleet with tomahawk cruise missiles are extremely important to the USA." Explaining why, he stated: "In case of a conflict in Europe, the USA will immediately open a second strategic front in the far East." Open it without asking for permission from its allies and not concerning itself with their fate in case of a nuclear conflict.

The banditries fed to the Japanese by the leaders of the Japan Defense Agency are designed only to camouflage accelerated militaristic preparations underway in Japan and to draw that nation more and more into Washington's strategy. This "book" reveals as never before the true intentions of the Japanese war department. This primarily involves attempts to revise the "Main Directions of Defense Development in Japan," adopted in 1976, ostensibly in order to bring its defense capabilities into conformity with the changes which have occurred in the 10 years. In other words, a revision leading to a drastic qualitative and quantitative build-up of the military capability. As though nothing has changed in this area during all those years. Why, Japan's military allocations have taken almost a 40-percent leap just in the past 5 years! And Yu. Kurihara, present chief of the Japan Defense Agency, openly advocates adjusting the ceiling on military expenditures, which was set 10 years ago in the amount of 1 percent of the gross national product. "We would like to observe and retain the ceiling of 1 percent, but it is far more important to implement our defense plan," he states.

The "White Book" promotes the idea that it is necessary to cooperate more closely with the USA as the main "guarantor of the security" of Japan. Its authors remain silent on the role and the missions of Japanese armed forces in America's strategic plans, however. They clearly do not wish to subject to the heat of criticism the policy of increasingly involving the nation in the American military plans. The other idea, that of retaining freedom for future maneuvering in this area, is not ruled out.

It is no secret that justified fears are growing in Japan that the revision of the defense policy being carried out by degrees will result in the elimination of all limitations on that nation's militarization. The newspaper TOKYO SHIMBUN writes that more than 4 decades after the nation's defeat in the war, it is once again moving along the path of becoming a military power. The newspaper notes that Japan has moved up to 4th place this year with respect to military allocations, following the U.S., Britain and the FRG. The newspaper ASIANI states that "the result

of the principles of Japanese military doctrine has taken it from defense of its own territory to a defense of naval lines of communication within a 1,000-mile zone around the Japanese Archipelago, joint strikes with the USA against targets in the USSR and a blockade of international straits."

A corresponding propaganda base is being erected beneath all of these militaristic preparations. None other than Minister of Education M. Fujio casts doubt upon the competence of the Tokya international trial of the main Japanese war criminals, as though he did not know that this process, like that of Nuremberg, was not only a trial of those specifically to blame for the predaceous war unleashed by fascist Germany and militaristic Japan, but also a trial by peoples of fascism and militarism. He states that "the time has come to reconsider the attitude toward the nation's history." "Why should everything pertaining to Japan's military past be considered bad?" he inquires, and sanctions a revision of the history books, deleting from them pages on the crimes of the Japanese military elite during World War II and depicting the policy of neighboring states in a false light. And is the same thing not indicated by a visit by almost the entire Diet to the Yasukuni temple, a citadel of Japanese militarism, where the seven main Japanese war criminals have been canonized?

Encouraged by their victory in the recent parliamentary elections, Japan's ruling circles are attempting to take advantage of this circumstance for resolving a number of important military-political matters--specifically, the elimination of the 1-percent ceiling on military outlays, the revision of the defense policy with a view to drastically increasing military preparations, and even greater involvement of the nation in the USA's global strategy. This is fraught with extremely serious and dangerous consequences for the cause of peace in the Asian and Pacific Ocean region and for the security of Japan itself.

11499
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FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

BRIEFS

MOSCOW TV: JAPAN'S BORDER MANEUVERS--Presently, Air Force maneuvers, the most extensive in the postwar history of the country, have begun in Japan. Today at 0000, all military airports in Japan were placed on combat alert. In 2 days these exercises will merge with the joint U.S.-Japanese naval maneuvers. Meanwhile, in the second half of October, a series of provocative maneuvers will be conducted on the northern island of Hokkaido, where the two allies will stage the first combined arms exercises in contemporary history in the immediate proximity of the Soviet borders. U.S. Marine units from U.S. bases in the Philippines, as well as U.S. planes armed with nuclear weapons stationed in South Korea, will take part. [Text] [Moscow Television Service in Russian 1110 GMT 18 Sep 86 OW]

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AFGHANISTAN

MOSCOW ON LIMITED SOVIET WITHDRAWAL FROM DRA

Withdrawal 'Push' to Political Settlement

LD111704 Moscow World Service in English 1531 GMT 11 Oct 86

[Unattributed commentary]

[Excerpts] It has been announced in Moscow that starting on the 15th of this month, that's next Wednesday, six regiments from among the limited Soviet Army contingent in Afghanistan will begin their return home. The troops are staying there on a temporary basis at the request of the Afghan Government. A comment now from our news analyst, and this is what he writes.

The general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Mikhail Gorbachev, first announced the decision to bring home the six Soviet regiments in his speech in Vladivostok in July. Now may I remind you that the Soviet leadership took the decision after having coordinated it with the Afghan Government on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of the situation within Afghanistan and around it. I would like to draw your attention also to two points. The return home of part of the limited Soviet Army contingent has become possible as a result of the normalization of the domestic situation in Afghanistan. The social base of the revolutionary government has notably expanded and there have been obvious gains in economic and social changes, followed through in Afghanistan by the People's Democratic Party and the government.

Another very important thing is that the Afghan Army has strengthened. A whole number of factors show that the political situation there is stabilizing and noticeable changes for the better are taking place. A telling blow was recently struck on the bandit units. Of course, it is yet early to speak of a full victory over the counterrevolutionaries, but in a number of provinces their positions have weakened and it has become possible to seal the borders with Pakistan and Iran to a considerable extent. The Afghan Armed Forces are gaining the necessary experience in the course of successful combat operations, they have carried out quite a few such operations.

The USSR and Afghanistan have taken a joint decision to bring home six Soviet regiments also in order to accelerate a political settlement of the situation

involving Afghanistan, to give a new push to it. Both countries have made it quite clear that the six regiments returning home is only the first step. The Soviet and Afghan Governments have coordinated the stages and the timetable of the return home of all the Soviet troops. The schedule may be changed for quicker return, but I would like to emphasize that the prerequisite for a political settlement must be a full stop to the army and any other interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan. Such is the firm position of both the Soviet and the Afghan leaderships.

What has been the initial reaction around the world to the announcement of the concrete timetable for the return home of the six Soviet regiments from Afghanistan? Broad sections of the international public welcome the move and regard it as a show of the sincere desire of the Soviet Union and Afghanistan for a political settlement. But the foes of Afghanistan, such as U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, are trying to cast doubt on the sincerity of our intentions. That is done in a very crude form; for instance, Mr Weinberger declared a few days ago that the Soviet Union has allegedly lately introduced additional army units in Afghanistan. A spokesman for the Soviet Defense Ministry has refuted the claim; he called the statement by the U.S. defense secretary a pure invention. We are surprised, said the Soviet Defense Ministry spokesman, that a top ranking American official could have permitted spreading such misinformation. As soon as the Armed Forces of Afghanistan have become fully strong and if the armed interference in the affairs of Afghanistan by imperialist forces stops, the Soviet Army contingents will fully return home.

Some Reasons for Withdrawal

LD080557 Moscow World Service in English 1710 GMT 7 Oct 86

[Excerpts] One of the main principles of peaceful coexistence is the principle of noninterference. All states must choose their way to development without any external pressure. This is what the Soviet stand towards events in Afghanistan is based on, and there the main development now is the coming home of six Soviet regiments. What lies behind this move? Here's what our observer Mikhail Glebov writes about it.

It may sound absurd, but both the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the return home of part of them now testify to the unchanging desire of the USSR to peacefully settle regional conflicts on the basis of self-determination of nations. Troops, especially on a foreign territory, are traditionally associated with wars and occupation. But reality goes far beyond this simplified scheme.

Soviet troops came to Afghanistan to help its people in repelling aggression from abroad, in defending its borders and the right to choose their way of life, to pursue the way of life they had chosen during the revolution a year and half before. A return home of a part of the Soviet military contingent now reflects changes in Afghanistan. The ranks of the rebels are thinning out.

Even those who fought against the republic are changing sides now, attracted by democratic reforms. But there is something more behind the decision to bring home the six regiments. By making this serious move, the USSR strives to accelerate the political settlement, to give it momentum. The other side must respond by curtailing interference into internal affairs of Democratic Afghanistan. And a final settlement that could guarantee the cessation of such interference will make it possible to withdraw all Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

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AFGHANISTAN

BAKHTAR POLITICAL OBSERVER ON STATE OF REBELS

LD101759 Moscow TASS in English 0801 GMT 10 Oct 86

[Text] Kabul October 10 TASS--A political observer of BAKHTAR writes:

With every passing day a large number of people formerly attached to counter-revolution lay down their arms and surrender themselves to the revolutionary state.

The surrendering of over 2,000 members of counter-revolutionary bands to the state of the DRA in the provinces of Parwan, Herat, Balkh, Jauzjan and Charasiab districts of Kabul Province testify to this fact.

The surrender of 500 members of the Gulbuddin Band in Shakardarah District of Parwan Province in the lapse of the past few weeks to the state of the DRA is another manifestation of the fact that a great number of the people belonging to the counter-revolutionary bands have realized the truths of the national and democratic April Revolution and have felt the futility of their ominous activity.

The State of the DRA which does not have any other objectives but the construction of a new prosperous Afghanistan promulgated the decree of general amnesty for all Afghans who would stop their saboteur activities and to join the DRA's government for peaceful activity.

The holding of the historical Loya Jirgah (National Grande Assembly), the High Jirgah of Frontier Tribes and Jirgah of Free Tribes in Kabul, the elections of the people's representatives to the local organs of state power and administration, the promulgation of national reconciliation are few of the steps taken for the creation of peace and understanding among the people.

Ignoring the humanistic measures of the State of DRA, the counter-revolutionary bands are desperately striving to disrupt peace and order in the country under the garb of Islam.

The people of Afghanistan are expressing their deep wrath and indignation against the counter-revolution.

The Armed Forces of the DRA are now enjoying a powerful combat power and the active support of the Afghan people.

Under such a condition, the counter-revolution does not have any other alternatives but to surrender to the cause of revolution.

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CSO: 1812/12

AFGHANISTAN

TASS REPORTS AFGHAN MUSEUM DISPLAY OF CHEMICAL ARMS

LD091411 Moscow TASS in English 1008 GMT 9 Oct 86

[Text] Kabul October 9 TASS--BAKHTAR News Agency reports:

The U.S. made chemical shells marked SC 517 and tens of poisonous material and lethal weapons made in the USA and other imperialist and reactionary countries attract the attention of the visitors of the military museum.

These weapons are put at the disposal of the counter-revolutionary bands for killing innocent people and they have been seized from them during combat operations by the Armed Forces of the DRA.

The curator of the museum said to a BAKHTAR reporter that the shells were captured by the armed forces from the counter-revolutionary bandits while trying to smuggle them into the country.

The sight of the poison bombs in the museum reminds to the visitors the bitter memory of 1980, when over 2,000 students and teachers of Kabul city were poisoned by chemical agent of fostoxine. The counter-revolutionaries have not only used chemical weapons, made in Western countries against the inhabitants of the country, but they have also made use of them during their desperate resistance against the military units.

It was said in the report issued by the Ministry of the DRA in 1982, that the counter-revolutionaries have used chemical weapons of CS kind during combat operations of the armed forces in the region of the village Shahrez, 8 kilo-metres from Bamyan city.

Colonel Ghulam Jailani had stated in this connection that murderous chemical weapons, including Western make 82 mm mortars, whose shells are polluted with poisonous material, and hand grenades bearing U.S. mark, whose pellets are polluted with poisonous material were seized from the counter-revolutionaries during combat operations.

He said that when these shells hit human beings, they poison their blood.

They were all made in Western countries and were put at the disposal of the counter-revolutionaries.

The U.S. imperialism and its Western allies not only make use of chemical weapons and agents for sowing death, destruction and anxiety among the people of Afghanistan, but they are also striving to make use of Afghanistan as a testing ground of chemical weapons.

As Colonel Ghulam Jailani had pointed out, the U.S. imperialism and its Western allies put special means at the disposal of the counter-revolutionary bands for collection and transmission of data on the effect of these chemical weapons to Western countries for further research.

The facts undeniably indicate that the counter-revolutionaries on the order of U.S. imperialism and its Western allies have committed unforgivable crimes with the use of chemical agents against the children and youth of the schools of Kabul city and other parts of the country.

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CSO: 1812/12

AFGHANISTAN

BRIEFS

'COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY BAND SMASHED'--Kabul September 28 TASS--Security forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) have smashed a counter-revolutionary band which repeatedly fired missiles on the residential areas of Kabul. The BAKHTAR News Agency has reported that an armed group of counter-revolutionaries, infiltrated from abroad, was fully smashed during a combat operation in Paghman District of Kabul Province. Many bandits, among them their leader, a certain Mohammad Del Qur [spelling as received] who put up resistance to security forces, were killed. Seven counterrevolutionaries surrendered. The captures criminals testified, the news agency points out, that the destroyed group had made arson attacks, had blown up schools and hospitals in Paghman District and killed civilians. They said that the band had received surface-to-surface missiles from a base located in Pakistani territory. Not risking to approach the capital, the counterrevolutionaries under the cover of night fired missiles on residential blocks. As a result of the barbarous actions, there was loss of life among civilians, including women, children and old men. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1234 GMT 28 Sep 86 LD] /6662

DRA FORCES ROUT 'COUNTERREVOLUTIONARY GANG'--Kabul October 12 TASS--The security forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan have routed a big counterrevolutionary gang which terrorized the population of the Pagman District. According to the BAKHTAR News Agency, in the course of the operation dozens of counterrevolutionaries were killed and wounded. Some 20 "surface-to-surface" missiles, machine-guns, rifles and anti-tank mines of foreign make were captured. According to the BAKHTAR report, another gang was routed by units of the Armed Forces of Afghanistan near the village of Kiskhak Suleyman, in the Herat Province. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1028 GMT 12 Oct 86 LD] /6662

TASS REPORTS DEATH OF DRA REBEL--Kabul September 25 TASS--Security forces in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan destroyed a counter-revolutionary group led by Shir Mohammad who was also known under the alias Mullah Kandaghari. A patented [as received] terrorist and robber guilty of death of many innocent civilians, he was killed at the time when he and his band left their hide-out and went to plunder villages. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0942 GMT 25 Sep 86 LD] /6662

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